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Studies show that a relatively small proportion of properties are responsible for a large 
proportion of the National Flood Insurance Program’s claims. While several household-level flood 
risk mitigation measures exist to address the pervasive losses, government acquisition of at-risk 
homes is the most effective household-level flood mitigation approach to eliminate the flood risk 
to properties, but also the most expensive. The program, despite its potential, is arguably the most 
controversial and thus under-utilized by homeowners. To encourage participation, flood risk 
mitigation officials and policy makers want to know the factors that affect homeowners’ 
willingness to participate in the program.  
So, to better inform policy makers, in this dissertation I examine empirically the factors 
that affect homeowner participation, including acquisition contract attributes, future insurance 
pricing, and availability of alternative mitigation efforts. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the 
growing literature on natural hazard risk mitigation and decision-making by providing evidence 
on the factors that influence homeowner participation in the government acquisition program. 
Also, this work provides valuable information on the potential effect of proposed programmatic 
changes on participation. In addition to attributes of the offered program, this dissertation explores 
how observables, like homeowner demographics and flood risk to the home, and latent 
characteristics, like homeowners’ perceptions of flood risk, also impact willingness to participate. 
The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and three self-contained papers organized into 
three chapters. 
In the first paper, which is presented in chapter 2, I combine homeowners’ stated 
preference, socioeconomic, and flood risk data to examine acquisition price effects on participation 
and provide willingness to accept estimates. This paper has been published in the Southern 
Economic Journal. 
The second paper builds on the first paper in several ways. I use data from a national survey 
that elicits homeowners' stated preference for household-level flood risk mitigation, to examine 
how proposed changes to the buyout program, coupled with availability of alternative mitigation 
options like home elevation and future insurance pricing, will affect buyout participation. I 
estimate a conditional logit model and a random parameter logit model and provide willingness to 
accept estimates.  
In the final paper, which is presented in chapter 4, I evaluate the policy implications of 
utilizing subjective or objective risk indicators in hazard risk management tools. In the paper, I 
derive a single index each for subjective and objective risk using factor analysis, then integrate 
these indices with the discrete choice data from chapter 3. I then estimate conditional logit models 
to derive willingness to accept estimates to better understand how different risk indicator types 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
Flooding due to extreme weather events has proven to be among the costliest natural 
disasters due to the scope and frequency of this hazard. Between 1980 and 2011, losses from 
floods around the world increased from an annual average of $7 billion to $24 billion 
(Kundzewicz, et al. 2012). In the U.S., between 2015 and 2019, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration lists 19 flood events as “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate 
Disasters” (NOAA 2020) (see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1: 2015-2019 events with significant flooding  
Event/ flooding Year Damage (billion $) 
Missouri River and North Central Flooding March 2019 10.9 
Arkansas River Flooding June 2019 3.1 
Mississippi River, Midwest, and Southern Flooding July 2019 6.3 
Tropical Storm Imelda September 2019 5.6 
Hurricane Dorian September 2019 1.6 
Hurricane Michael October 2018 25.5 
Hurricane Florence September 2018 24.5 
California Flooding February 2017 1 
Missouri and Arkansas flooding April 2017 1.7 
Hurricane Harvey August 2017 126.3 
Hurricane Maria September 2017 90.9 
Hurricane Irma September 2017 50.5 
Texas and Louisiana March 2016 2.3 
Houston April 2016 2.7 
West Virginia flooding June 2016 1 
Louisiana August 2016 10.1 
North Carolina flooding due to Hurricane Mathew October 2016 10.1 
Texas and Oklahoma flooding May 2015 2.6 





There is a consensus that the greater share of the losses is concentrated in the coastal 
environment where millions of people live.1 Coastal U.S. is vulnerable to tropical cyclones 
(hurricanes, tropical and sub-tropical storms, and nor’easters)2 (Marks and Shay 1998), with the 
Gulf and Atlantic Coasts struck almost annually by a tropical cyclones (Curtis 2013). The 
resulting storm surge, compounded by eustatic sea-level rise, riverine and estuarine flooding, 
rising coastal populations, and increasing assets, results in dramatic flood losses (NOAA 2000). 
Unfortunately, predictions indicate that the intensity of tropical cyclones and sea-level rise are 
expected to increase due to climate change (Knutson, et al. 2010; Intercontinental Panel on 
Climate Change - IPCC, 2007; United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction - 
UNISDR, 2011). In low-income environments where properties are not insured, losses from 
floods could have significant impacts on livelihoods, and where flood insurance is the norm, the 
ability of insurers to meet growing damage claims is questionable. 
Since 1968, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has provided federally 
subsidized flood insurance to homeowners and businesses. Unsurprisingly, over 70 percent of the 
policies are concentrated in coastal areas (Smith and Katz 2013). One particular problem that has 
plagued NFIP is rising numbers and magnitude of flood damage claims. The program’s debt was 
scheduled to exceed its $30 billion borrowing limit until $16 billion in debt was canceled in 
October 2017. Over the last 50 years, NFIP has gone through a series of reauthorizations to 
address perverse incentives that exacerbated losses. Unfortunately, efforts to raise premiums 
have failed. Considering this, other approaches to mitigate flood losses, such as government 
acquisition (buyouts) of at-risk homes has received considerable attention at all policy making 
 
1 The United States Census Bureau (USCB) estimates that about 94 million (29%of U.S. population) people live in 
coastline counties and 60 million people are in the path of tropical cyclones (USCB 2018). 
2 Between 1980 and 2000, tropical cyclones caused the most damage ($954.4 billion, CPI-adjusted) (NOAA 2000).  
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levels. Nevertheless, participation in the program is voluntary, and individuals frequently will 
not engage in cost-effective hazard risk mitigation measures voluntarily (Kunreuther 2006)3. 
Thus, it is important to understand what factors affect a homeowner’s decision to participate in 
the government acquisition program. Acquisition of the most at-risk properties will aid in 
improving the solvency of NFIP.        
 To that end, the purpose of this work is to strengthen the understanding of the factors that 
affect a homeowner’s decision to participate in the government acquisition program. 
Specifically, the objectives of this work are to examine;  
1. The extent to which the size of acquisition payment affects homeowners’ willingness to 
accept acquisition contracts, and whether price effects vary with the timing of acquisition 
contracts (i.e., before or after a hurricane event damages a home), and other observables.  
2. How proposed changes to the government acquisition program, coupled with availability 
of alternative mitigation options like home elevation and future insurance pricing, will 
affect participation. 
3. The policy implications of utilizing subjective or objective risk indicators in hazard risk 
management tools.  
Managing Flood Risk in the U.S. 
 
  Flood risk management decisions are made at all levels- public (i.e., federal and local 
government) and private (households and businesses). The public, through federal and state 
institutions such as the U.S Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Federal Emergency 
 
3 Several reasons account for why individuals will not mitigate against hazard risk voluntarily. “They underestimate 
the likelihood of a future disaster, often believing that it will not happen to them; have budget constraints; are 
myopic in their behavior; and/or do not want to be the only one on the block modifying their structure” Kunreuther 
(2006).   
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Management Agency (FEMA), oversees different types of flood mitigation and flood related 
activities by implementing structural (e.g., construction of dams, levees, drainage channels), non-
structural (e.g., land use and building regulations and standards, and flood insurance), and green 
approaches (e.g., wetlands) (Carter, et al., 2018 and Bakkensen, 2020). The private, on the other 
hand, is responsible for participating in government flood risk mitigation programs by 
purchasing flood insurance, retrofitting private property or relocating to less flood risk zones.   
Prior to 1965, the public heavily relied on structural approaches to manage flood risk. 
However, between 1965 and 1992, flood risk management shifted from predominantly structural 
to non-structural approaches. Currently, flood risk management has turned towards relocating 
existing structures from floodplains and preventing development of new ones (Fraser, et al. 
2003). To encourage residents to relocate from floodplains and other high-risk areas, the federal 
government, through FEMA, has implemented the government acquisition program.  
Acquisition refers to the purchase of at-risk property (e.g., land and/or structure) by the 
government or relocate structures (e.g. manufactured homes) from floodplains to zones with 
lower flood risk (Handmer, 1985). The acquisition program is primarily financed through the 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) which is a flood risk reduction program under the 
Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) grant program and is authorized by Section 404 of the 
Stafford Act, 42 U. S. C. 5170c (FEMA 2015) (Frimpong, et al. 2019). The program, although 
started in 1990, gained popularity in recent decades. “Several communities with significant flood 
risk have used HMGP funds to acquire flood prone properties. For example, after the Great 
Midwest Floods in 1993, Cherokee and Story County in Iowa bought 157 properties and 28 
properties respectively (FEMA 2011). About 800 properties were bought out in Grand Forks, 
North Dakota after the floods of 1997 (De Vries and Fraser 2012). Another 400 properties were 
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acquired in San Antonio, Texas in 1998 (De Vries and Fraser 2012). After Hurricanes Fran and 
Floyd in 1999, about 1,150 properties were bought in Greenville and Kinston, North Carolina 
(De Vries and Fraser 2012). Before funds are disbursed for a prospective property, Benefit-Cost 
Analysis is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of the acquisition (FEMA 2005)” (Frimpong, et 
al. 2019). The federal government supports up to 75% of the cost of acquiring at-risk properties 
while additional funds come from local or state government, the homeowner, and other non-
governmental agencies (FEMA 2018a). “This collective of potential funding groups implies that 
total compensation may fall short of or exceed 100% of property value (Binder and Greer 2016)” 
(Frimpong, et al. 2019). “Individual homeowners cannot directly apply to FEMA to secure 
acquisition contracts for their property. Instead, states, territories, and federally-recognized tribes 
are eligible to apply for funds from the HMGP (FEMA 2015). Once funds are distributed to a 
state, territory, or federally recognized tribe, a local agency (e.g. state hazard mitigation officer 
or tribe representative) is responsible for managing the funds and approaching property owners 
with acquisition offers. Property owner participation in the acquisition program is voluntary. 
Acquired structures are demolished or relocated to higher ground if possible. Once the lot is 
cleared, it typically becomes open space or may be converted to a recreational area (FEMA 
2005)” (Frimpong, et al. 2019).       
“The program generally benefits both parties (i.e., property owners and the implementing 
government agencies). Barnhizer (2003) notes that for every $1 invested in the acquisition 
program, property owners who accept acquisition contracts generated $2 in reduction of future 
flood insurance premia. Further, the program gives homeowners the opportunity to financially 
protect against decreased property value (Greer and Binder 2017). Governments, both federal 
and local, also save on future expenditures for flood mitigation and response when an area is 
6 
 
cleared of flood prone structures (Barnhizer 2003). Acquisition can also benefit other members 
of society, as the resulting open space may be used for fishing, hunting, boating, and hiking 
(Barnhizer 2003). The open space may also help to mitigate future floods (Brody and Highfield 
2013). The effect on adjacent property values is mixed with Barnhizer (2003) showing an 
increase in nearby property values and Zavar (2015) finding no effect” (Frimpong, et al. 2019).   
Despite these benefits, government acquisition programs face challenges including high 
cost of implementing the program (Barnhizer 2003) and low participation rates (Fraser, et al. 
2003; deVries 2017; Bukvic and Owen 2017) and so officials are considering programmatic 
changes to the program. The proposed changes will potentially allow homeowners to retain 
ownership of the deed-restricted lot and build new structures so long as they meet current local 
building codes (Flavelle 2018). The program is also expected to run on a continuous basis and 
not just after a presidential disaster declaration. It is in this regard that I seek to explain what 
factors motivate homeowners to participate in the acquisition program. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized into 3 chapters. Chapter 2 addresses objective 1 
of the study while chapters 3 and 4 address objectives 2 and 3 respectively
 
CHAPTER 2 : MEASURING HETEROGENEOUS PRICE EFFECTS FOR HOME 




Any entity offering flood insurance, whether it is private or government- administered 
such as the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), faces the challenge of solvency. This is 
especially true for the NFIP, where homeowner affordability criteria limit the opportunity to 
increase premia. One solution is to remove the highest flood risk properties from the insurer’s 
book of business. Acquisition (buyout) of flood prone structures is a potentially permanent 
solution that eliminates the highest risk properties while providing homeowners with financial 
assistance to relocate in a less risky location. To encourage participation, homeowners are 
offered a pre-flood fair market value of their damaged (or at-risk of damage) structures. 
Although many factors have been shown to affect a homeowner’s decision to accept an 
acquisition offer, very little research has been devoted to the influence of price or monetary 
incentive offered on homeowners’ willingness to participate in acquisition programs. We 
estimate a pooled probit model and employ a bootstrap methodology to determine the effects of 
hypothetical home price offers on homeowners’ acquisition decisions. We do so while 
controlling for environmental factors, property characteristics, and homeowner socio-
demographic characteristics. Results show price indeed has a positive effect on likelihood of 
accepting an acquisition contract. Further, estimated homeowner supply curves differ 
 
4 With Jamie Kruse, Gregory Howard, Rachel Davidson, Joseph Trainor, and Linda Nozick; in Southern Economic 
Journal. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under collaborative awards #1435298, 
1433622, and 1434716. The statements, findings, and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily 









The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is tasked with multiple, sometimes contradictory 
goals. These include providing insurance at affordable premiums, gaining high participation rates 
in at-risk areas, and generating sufficient revenues to support the cost of the program. In recent 
decades, the NFIP has fallen short of this final solvency goal, often to the tune of billions of 
dollars per year. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (B-W 12), an attempt 
to address solvency through a move towards risk-based premium rate structures, met with such 
public resistance that the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA) was 
enacted to postpone or roll back proposed rate increases. Consequently, as of March 2017 the 
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), which administers the NFIP, owed the Department of Treasury $24.6 billion 
(before the devastating 2017 hurricane season). 
In an effort to eliminate the recurring societal and economic damages from floods, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) introduced programs such as the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to incentivize owners with repeat flood loss homes to move 
or retrofit the at-risk structures or sell to the government for demolition (FEMA 2015). 
Government acquisition programs are usually activated after a presidential disaster declaration. 
Homeowners’ participation in the HMGP is voluntary, and those who choose to participate are 
offered a price based on the pre-damage fair market value of their damaged or at-risk property. 
Up to 75% of the cost of acquiring such properties is supported by the federal government while 
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additional funds come from local or state government, the homeowner, and other non-
governmental agencies (FEMA 2018a). This collective of potential funding groups implies that 
total compensation may fall short of or exceed 100% of property value (Binder and Greer 2016).  
The HMGP was introduced in 1988 (Fraser, Doyle, and Young 2006) and gained 
prominence after the Great Midwest Floods of 1993 when FEMA began financing the 
acquisition of damaged properties (Greer and Binder 2017). As of 2004, an estimated 100,415 
structures were identified as repetitive loss properties according to a 2004 GAO Report (General 
Accounting Office 2004).5 By 2012, it was estimated that 20,000 damaged and at-risk properties 
have been acquired and demolished or relocated (Maly and Ishikawa 2013). That is, 
homeowners’ participation in the HMGP acquisition program has not been encouraging (Fraser, 
et al. 2003; deVries 2017; Bukvic and Owen 2017). The question therefore is, why are some 
homeowners with property in high flood risk areas willing to accept acquisition contracts while 
others are not, and what factors influence this decision?  
Prior empirical studies that have attempted to answer the preceding question note that 
socio-demographic factors, environmental factors, property characteristics, program funding, 
ability of local flood mitigation officials to guide homeowners through the process, and sense of 
place affect property owners’ decision to accept acquisition contracts (Handmer 1985; Fraser, et 
al. 2003; Fraser, Doyle, and Young 2006; Fraser, De Vries, and Young 2006; De Vries and 
Fraser 2012; Kick, et al. 2011; Zavar, Hagelman, and Rugeley 2012; Bukvic, Smith, and Zhang 
2015; Reeser 2016; Robinson, et al. 2018). Surprisingly, sensitivity to price changes in 
acquisition contracts has not been rigorously addressed in the literature.   
 
5 Repetitive loss properties have experienced two or more flood insurance claims of $1,000 or more (GAO 2004). 
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This chapter examines the extent to which the size of acquisition payment affects 
homeowners’ willingness to accept acquisition contracts, and whether price effects vary with the 
timing of acquisition contracts (i.e., before or after a hurricane event damages a home) and other 
observables. We address these important questions using survey data of eastern North Carolina 
homeowners. We estimate a panel-style pooled probit model to determine the effect of 
hypothetical home price offers on homeowners’ decisions to accept acquisition contracts. We 
also examine the effect of environmental factors, property characteristics, and homeowner socio-
demographic characteristics on both i) the average willingness to accept a contract and ii) 
homeowner response to changes in the offered buyout payment. We use these models to 
construct buyout property supply curves illustrating the quantity of homes willing to accept 
buyout contracts for a range of payment levels. A block bootstrap methodology is then used to 
test for heterogeneity in supply along the covariates. Results reveal a positive price effect on 
likelihood of accepting an acquisition contract. This effect is universal, but not uniform, instead 
varying in magnitude depending on the timing of the contract offer and other factors described 
below.    
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides related literature review 
on homeowners’ decision to participate in acquisition. We then proceed with the survey design 
and administration, the econometric model, results and discussion, and finally concluding 
remarks and future work.  
 
Related Literature  
 
Several previous studies have explored a variety of factors that affect homeowners’ acquisition 
decision-making. Handmer (1985) analyzed survey data of homeowners from three communities 
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in Australia to understand homeowners’ behavior toward acquisition programs. Their mode of 
analysis was purely descriptive, and their results show that perception of benefit from 
acquisition, perception of flood risk, and attachment to community or place affect acquisition 
behavior. In the U.S., Fraser, et al. (2003) collected survey data from four study sites (Greenville 
and Kinston in North Carolina; Grand Forks, North Dakota; and San Antonio, Texas) to study 
homeowners’ decisions to accept acquisition offers. Based on their descriptive analysis, 
perception about the likelihood of future flooding, ability to find affordable homes, fear of 
greater debt, loss of rental homes, attachment to the community, length of time it takes for 
officials to approach homeowners after a flood disaster, and length of time to complete the 
acquisition process affects a homeowner’s decision to participate in the acquisition program.  
Other studies have approached the issue using different analytical methods. Fraser, 
Doyle, and Young (2006) used a logistic regression framework to analyze survey data of 
homeowners of repetitive loss structures in the U.S. They controlled for variables including 
property condition, neighborhood attachment, helpfulness of mitigation officials, income, and 
presence of children in households. They find that helpfulness and site match have positive 
effects on the likelihood of accepting acquisition, while property condition, neighborhood 
attachment, median income, and presence of children in households had a negative relationship. 
In a similar study, Fraser, De Vries, and Young (2006) interviewed homeowners in eight 
repetitive loss sites in the U.S. They find that a host of factors affect the decision to accept 
mitigation programs in North Carolina, including program funding, income, ability of local flood 
mitigation officials to guide homeowners through the process, neighborhood attachment, 
presence of children, and perception of property condition.       
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De Vries and Fraser (2012) analyzed data from a Fraser, et al. (2003) survey to determine 
factors affecting the homeowner acquisition decision. They controlled for the extent of damage 
to the neighborhood, homeowners’ ability to live in the home after the flood, home repairs after 
the flood, importance of family members, clarity of information, length of time for officials to 
approach homeowners, perception of voluntariness of the program, availability of alternative 
choices, perceived pressure felt to participate, trust in officials, opportunity of flooded residents 
to provide input, opposition voiced by residents, age, years left on mortgage, education, income, 
location fixed effects, and race. Only the importance of family members, availability of 
alternative choices, trust in officials, and income were significant in explaining the acquisition 
decision. Zavar, Hagelman, and Rugeley (2012) also investigated the relationship between site 
characteristics (total area of parcel, land value prior to flood, and structural improvement value 
prior to flood, and parcel proximity to central business district), location relative to river valley 
features, and property owners post disaster decision-making after the 2002 flood event in the 
central Texas Guadalupe River Valley. Results from a multinomial logistic regression model 
show that distance to river and land value prior to flood were negatively related to the decision to 
relocate or participate in acquisition. Other variables in the model were not significant. Bukvic, 
Smith, and Zhang (2015) also examined the effect of pre-disaster socio-economic household 
characteristics, level of preparedness, disaster exposure, experience with recovery, community 
embeddedness, and resource loss on the decision to relocate away from high risk areas in New 
Jersey after Hurricane Sandy. A correlation analysis revealed that the household decision to 
relocate is influenced by respondent’s age, disaster exposure, level of experienced stress related 
recovery, personal financial recovery concerns, future cost of living in the high-risk area, 
concerns with increase in crime, future flooding, and disaster-induced resource loss.   
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More recent studies on homeowner acquisition decisions have found similar results. For 
example, Reeser (2016) examined factors that affect homeowners’ willingness to pay to secure 
acquisition contracts and willingness to accept for acquisition contracts tied to mandatory flood 
insurance purchase. Homeowner-level data were collected using an online payment card 
contingent valuation survey. The survey considered the entire U.S., finding that homeowners are 
willing to pay an average of $605 to secure an acquisition contract. In determining factors 
affecting willingness to accept for an acquisition contract that was coupled with a requirement to 
buy flood insurance, Reeser (2016) controlled for variables such as self-reported flood risk, 
household size, environmental concern, income, race, neighborhood tenure, elevated homes, age, 
education, and past claims. Logistic regression results show that self-reported flood risk, 
household size, environmental concern, and income had a positive relationship with acquisition 
acceptance. Robinson, et al. (2018) also explored factors that affect homeowners’ decision to 
accept government acquisition in eastern North Carolina. Survey data from homeowners were 
analyzed, and results from a logistic regression model revealed that location in the floodplain, 
expected future tenure, the number of hurricanes previously experienced, fatalism, and race were 
the only variables significant in explaining homeowner decision to accept government 
acquisition.  
Kick, et al. (2011) is the study that comes closest to examining the effect of offered price 
on acquisition acceptance. They analyze survey data on repetitive-loss homeowners’ mitigation 
decision to determine factors that affect the ease of reaching a relocation mitigation decision. 
Data were collected across 8 study sites throughout the southern and western U.S. In addition to 
explanatory variables considered in previously mentioned studies, the authors examine whether 
state or local agencies offered a 25% site match on top of the 75% offered by federal agencies. 
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Results from a structural Equation model show offering a 25% site price match, which raises the 
buyout offer from 75% of market value to 100%, increases the ease of reaching a relocation 
mitigation decision.  
In summary, there is strong support and general consensus in the literature regarding the 
effects of attachment to place, property condition, site characteristics, location in floodplain, and 
distance to shore/coastline on acquisition acceptance, while evidence on the effects of other 
variables is limited or mixed.  
  
 Survey Design and Administration 
 
The survey was designed to collect primary data on homeowners’ hurricane mitigation decisions. 
Prior to evaluating the questions, respondents were informed that the survey was funded by the 
National Science Foundation and that their responses will benefit emergency planning 
professionals, researchers, and themselves (homeowners). This was done with the goal of 
establishing policy consequentiality among respondents, though no additional questions or tests 
of perceived consequentiality followed in the body of the survey. The survey took approximately 
20 minutes to complete, with the first three questions acting as screening questions that ask 
homeowners whether they (i) are at least 18 years old, (ii) owned and lived at the delivery 
address of the survey, and (iii) take part in making decisions related to the property. The bulk of 
the survey collected data on hurricane experience, home retrofit decision, homeowner 
preferences for acquisition programs, and sociodemographic factors. While the survey collected 
data on a broad range of hurricane mitigation questions, in this chapter, we analyze questions 
that focus on acquisition. Respondents were briefed on acquisition programs using the following 
short script: Property acquisition (buyout) programs pay residents to move away from dangerous 
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areas so that no one will suffer damage or injury in that home during future events, and were 
also asked whether the government has ever made an offer to buy their home. Figure 2.1 presents 
the survey questions used to capture homeowner acquisition decisions given hypothetical offers. 
Homeowner addresses were geocoded and used to collect data on distance to coastline, lot 
size, and whether the property is located in a floodplain. Data on lot size were obtained from 
county web sites (e.g., Wake County Government 2018) and the real estate web site “Zillow” 
(Zillow 2018) while property location in a floodplain was determined based on FEMA’s flood 
map data (FEMA 2018b). Table 2.1 presents a description of variables used in our analyses. The 
survey was mailed to respondents in January 2017. A total of 2,500 households were randomly 
selected for the study. The sample was purchased from “Genesys,” a branch of the Marketing 
Systems Group, which utilizes the U.S. Postal Service’s address database system to select 
random addresses for research purposes. Our sample consists of only single-family households in 
eastern North Carolina. In administering the survey, we followed the recommendations of 
Dillman (2007) to achieve high survey response rates. Four contacts through first-class mail were 
made to each household. First, postcards were mailed indicating that respondents’ participation 
in a scientific research study was being requested. One week after the postcards were sent, the 
surveys were mailed. The survey packet consisted of the questionnaire, a stamped return 
envelope, and a $1 bill incentive. Two weeks later, a postcard was mailed to respondents to serve 
as a reminder. A final reminder was sent out two weeks after that. To ensure personalization, the 
survey begins with a personalized note from two of the project’s principal investigators. As of 
April 2017, the total surveys returned were 233. Using the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research’s (AAPOR) metrics for survey response rates (AAPOR 2018) and factoring 
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out refusals and undeliverable surveys, our minimum response rate is 10% (AAPOR 1). After 
accounting for missing values, a total of 152 responses were used in our regression analysis.  
The state of North Carolina is divided into three geographic regions—the Appalachian 
Region, Piedmont Region, and the Coastal Plain Region (Lecce 2000). The eastern part of North 
Carolina is the Coastal Plain Region, and it extends from the coastline to the Piedmont boundary. 
Eastern North Carolina has experienced devastating hurricane-related flood events in recent 
decades (e.g., Hurricanes Fran and Floyd in 1999). As recently as 2016, Hurricane Matthew 
made land fall as a category 1 hurricane, damaging about 100,000 structures and killing 26 
people in the eastern part of North Carolina (North Carolina 2017a). The after-Mathew 
rebuilding strategy for 50 counties in eastern North Carolina includes offering acquisition 
contracts to selected properties (North Carolina 2017b). Additional flood damage occurred in 
September of 2018 due to Hurricane Florence. Figure 2.2 presents the distribution of 
respondents’ property in the study area. The dots represent respondent property locations and the 





























Table 2.1: Summary of variables 
Variable Description 
Acquisition  
Choice (dependent variable) = 1 if homeowner is willing to accept acquisition at a given pre-
damage fair market value of property (Price), and 0 otherwise  
  
Before hurricane event  = 1 if homeowner response of accepting acquisition is observed 
before hurricane event, and 0 otherwise (after hurricane event)  
After hurricane event = 1 if homeowner response of accepting acquisition is observed 
after hurricane event, and 0 otherwise (before hurricane event)  
Price Percentage of home value government is willing to offer to 
homeowner in exchange for homeowner’s house. These are 
hypothetical and include 75%, 90%, 100%, 110%, 125%  
Environmental factors 
Floodplain = 1 if property is in a 100-year floodplain, and 0 otherwise  
Distance to coastline Measured in kilometers as the straight line distance from the 
North Carolina coastline to the homeowner property location  
Property Characteristic 
Lot size Homeowner's lot size is measured in acres 
Socio-demographics 
Tenure in home Number of years a homeowner has lived in the current house  
Race =1 if homeowner is White, and 0 otherwise 
Income  Income represents annual household income and is in three 
categories. Lower = 1 if income is < $50,000, and 0 otherwise. 
Middle = 1 if income > $49,999 and less than $100,000, and 0 
otherwise. Higher = 1 if income > $99,999, and 0 otherwise. 
Education =1 if homeowner has at least 2 years of college or higher 











Each homeowner makes a total of 10 choices, so we may describe our data as a panel. We 
specify the econometric model as  
yit = Xiβ + Pitθ + εit,             (2.1) 
where yit is the dependent variable (choice) for the i
th homeowner in choice situation t; Xi is a 
vector of respondent- and property-level covariates: Floodplain, Distance to coastline, Lot size, 
Tenure in home, Race, Income, and Education; Pit is a vector of choice-specific covariates, 
which include an indicator for whether the contract is offered before or after the house has 
sustained damage from a hurricane as well as price variables; β and θ are vectors of parameters 
to be estimated; and it  is the random error component. Our choice-specific covariates contain 
variables that have within-decision-maker variation while our respondent- and property-level 
covariates exhibit between-decision-maker variation but lack within-decision-maker variation.  
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 Panel models are categorized as pooled, random effects, or fixed effects based on 
assumptions regarding the error term (Wooldridge 2002; Greene 2012). Pooled models assume 
no individual unobserved effects (i.e., homeowners are homogeneous beyond what can be 
captured in covariates), and that the random error component is uncorrelated with the covariates 
(Wooldridge 2002; Greene 2012). The fixed effects model assumes unobserved effects, and that 
the unobserved effects and random error component are correlated with the covariates. A 
disadvantage of the fixed-effects model is the inability to estimate variables that lack within-
decision-maker variation (in our case Distance to coastline and Lot size). Unlike the fixed-
effects, random-effects models assume no correlation between the unobserved effects or the 
random error component and the covariates (Wooldridge 2002; Greene 2012). We utilize a 
pooled model. Given that our dependent variable is binary, we link the dependent variable to the 
covariates via the probit link function: 
1[Pr( 1| )] . it i i ity 
− += = +itP θx X         (12.2) 
We acknowledge the possibility that the random error component may be correlated within units 
(individual homeowners’ responses), thereby underestimating true standard errors (Cameron, 
Gelbach, and Miller 2008). As such we correct for this by computing the cluster-robust standard 
errors as recommended in the literature (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008), clustering at the 
respondent level. 
 With the goal of estimating price effects on homeowner willingness to participate in 
buyout programs, and further to examine whether price effects exhibit heterogeneity on 
demographics and other observables, we estimate the following models: 
Φ−1[Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖] = 𝑿𝒊𝜷 + 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 +  (2.2a) 
(𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡)𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒×𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡)𝜃𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟×𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
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Φ−1[Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖] = 𝑿𝒊𝜷 + [𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 × 𝐼(𝑍 = 1)]𝑖𝑡𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒×𝐼(𝑍=1) +(2.2b) 
[𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐼(𝑍 = 1)]𝑖𝑡𝜃𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟×𝐼(𝑍=1) + 
   [𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 × (1 − 𝐼(𝑍 = 1))]
𝑖𝑡
𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒×(1−𝐼(𝑍=1)) +  
 [𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 × 𝐼(𝑍 = 1) × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒]𝑖𝑡𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒×𝐼(𝑍=1)×𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 
 [𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐼(𝑍 = 1) × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡]𝜃𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟×𝐼(𝑍=1)×𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 
 [𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 × (1 − 𝐼(𝑍 = 1)) × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡]𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒×(1−𝐼(𝑍=1))𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 
[𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × (1 − 𝐼(𝑍 = 1)) × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡]𝜃𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟×(1−𝐼(𝑍=1))×𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒. 
Equation (2.2a) represents our simplest model. This model includes the entire list of individual- 
and property-level covariates (including a constant), an indicator for whether the choice 
concerned the house before a hurricane had damaged the property (Before), and two price-timing 
interaction variables. These interactions allow for different price effects based on whether the 
acquisition contract is offered immediately following damage from a hurricane event. Thus, this 
model allows for heterogeneity in willingness-to-accept (WTA) based on timing of the offer and 
allows for the construction of separate homeowner supply curves, one for pre-damage houses 
and one for post-damage houses. However, this model assumes that price effect heterogeneity is 
not linked to underlying property and property owner characteristics. 
Equation (2.2b) broadly describes our more complicated models, which allow for further 
heterogeneity. In addition to timing (pre- and post-damage), these models allow for 
heterogeneity in price sensitivity by homeowner or home characteristics. The characteristics we 
examine in these models include race (white vs. nonwhite), homeowner tenure in the property 
(less than 10 years vs. 10 years or more), education level (less than college degree vs. college 
degree or more) flood risk to the property (located in the 100-year flood plain vs. not located in 
the 100-year flood plain), and income level (low, medium and high income, as defined in Table 
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2.1). Each version of Equation (2b) identifies one covariate, denoted Z, from the covariate vector 
X. This covariate is removed and instead is included with two-way (Z and timing dummies) and 
three-way (Z, timing dummies and price) interactions in the model6. This methodology allows us 
to test for heterogeneous WTA values and to estimate different homeowner supply curves for 
each covariate-timing combination. Most covariates are indicator variables, which result in four 
supply curves representing each component of the 2x2 covariate-timing matrix.7 For estimates of 
interest that include nonlinear combinations of coefficients (i.e., marginal effects and the 
probability of accepting acquisition contracts for various hypothetical property price offers), we 
use block bootstrapping to estimate standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani 1985; Efron and 





Bootstrap methodology is a well-known resampling method used to determine how accurate an 
estimate is an estimator of the true parameter (Efron and Tibshirani 1985; Efron and Tibshirani 
1986). The approach involves randomly sampling (with replacement) from available data set to 
estimate the probability distribution of a statistic of interest (Efron and Efron and Tibshirani 
1993). As the bootstrap samples approach infinity, the estimate approaches the true parameter of 
interest. Several bootstrap approaches exist, and the preferred approach depends on the kind of 
data set in-use (Hounkannounon 2008). For time series and panel data, the block bootstrap (or 
cluster bootstrap) is recommended because it allows for correlation of errors within clusters or 
 
6 Thus, the notation 𝑿𝒊𝜷 in Equation (2.2b) represents the full vector X less the heterogeneous covariate Z. 
7 The one exception to this is income, which has three categories, leading to a 3x2 matrix of income-timing 
combinations and a total of six supply curves. 
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groups but not across groups (Hounkannounon 2008; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008; Kilian 
and Jung Kim 2011). Bootstrap standard errors obtained from the bootstrap estimates are useful 
for constructing bootstrap confidence intervals for parameters of interest (Efron and Tibshirani 
1985; Efron and Tibshirani 1986).         
 To estimate the marginal effects and the probability of accepting acquisition contracts for 
various hypothetical property price offers, we first estimate a pool probit model (correcting for 
error correlation) and obtain predicted probabilities for each price offer. We then sum these 
probabilities across homeowners and obtain a mean value (scalar) for each price offer. We 
perform the cluster bootstrap to estimate the true standard errors for the means. We use 1000 
bootstrap replications in this chapter. This number of replications is considered to be more than 
adequate (Efron and Tibshirani 1985). The bootstrap is performed using Stata software. The 
confidence intervals obtained from the bootstrap are normal-base. That is the confidence 
intervals are based on the assumption that bootstrap sampling distribution approximates a 
Gaussian distribution. We also test for differences between bootstrap probability estimates. The 
predictive probabilities are used to plot supply curves that indicate the likelihood a homeowner 
will give up property in exchange for the price offered. 
It is noteworthy that the econometric methodology utilized here differs from the standard 
in the literature for our payment card-style elicitation question. Typically, this data would be 
modeled using interval regression approaches (Cameron and Hupper 1989; Welsh and Poe 
1998). While we acknowledge this deviation from standard practice in the literature, our 
modeling methods are consistent with the methods used in discrete choice modeling for similar 
stated preference surveys, and similar (though not identical) methods have been used when the 
payment card method is combined with an uncertainty response scale (Vossler et al. 2004; Wang 
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and Whittington 2005). Our primary reason for utilizing the probit instead of interval regression 
approach is due to the increased flexibility possible in the probit. In this context, interval 
regressions can estimate how home and homeowner characteristics influence homeowner WTA 
for the buyout program. A similar estimation is possible using the probit model, but the probit 
model allows for the estimation of price sensitivities by the said home and homeowner 
characteristics in a more flexible way. More specifically, the interval regression estimates how 
different characteristics influence the estimated payment needed to elicit agreement to the buyout 
offer. By contrast, the probit model can estimate both how these characteristics alter the utility of 
an offer (i.e., heterogeneous intercepts) and how the marginal utility of changing the buyout 
payment can differ by characteristics (i.e., heterogeneous slopes related to payment). 
To the best of our knowledge, these two distinct effects cannot be separated using the interval 
regression. As a robustness check, we also show that the results of our probit model largely 




We split our hypotheses into two groups: those pertaining to raw likelihood of accepting buyout 
contracts (holding offered price constant) and those pertaining to price sensitivity to buyout 
contracts (how changing price alters the probability of contract acceptance). 
  Hypothesis 1: Buyout acceptance will be higher among homeowners who  
i. Are high-income 
ii. Live in the floodplain 
iii. Have had shorter tenure in the home 
iv. Are closer to the coastline 
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v. Are offered the contract post-damage 
These hypotheses largely follow the findings of previous work. De Vries and Fraser (2012) and 
Reeser (2016) both found higher-income individuals are more likely to accept buyout contracts. 
Homeowners in floodplains more frequently experience flooding events and have a higher 
perception of flood risk, leading us to hypothesize that they are more likely to accept acquisition 
offers. Numerous studies find long tenure in the home reduces buyout acceptance rates (Fraser, 
Dodyle, and Young 2006; Fraser, De Vries, and Young 2006; and Kick, et al. 2011), while 
Zavar, Hagelman, and Rugeley (2012) note that homeowners who are distant from the river are 
less likely to relocate. We also expect that the prospect of avoiding costly repair to post-damage 
houses will make homeowners more likely to accept offers post-damage than pre-damage.   
Alternate Hypothesis: Sensitivity to buyout price will be higher among homeowners who  
i. Are low-income 
ii. Are on larger lots 
iii. Are offered the contract pre-damage 
iv. Live outside the floodplain 
v. Have had longer tenure in the home 
vi. Are further from the coastline 
Possible explanation why low-income homeowners will be more responsive to price 
changes would be that a 10% increase in the offered price represents a larger portion of the net 
assets of a low-income household than a similar percentage increase offered to a high-income 
household. Similarly, a 10% increase in the offer on a larger lot may represent a larger absolute 
increase in money offered, and therefore be more persuasive, than a similar increase on a smaller 
lot. Lastly, we reason that groups who are generally disposed toward accepting a buyout contract 
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will be less sensitive to price changes than a similar group who is, on average, disposed to reject 
a buyout contract. Presented in Table 2.2 are summary statistics of the variables. 
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Category  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Choice  binary 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Before hurricane event  binary 0.50 0.50 0 1 
After hurricane event binary 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Price percent 100 17.03 75 125 
Floodplain binary 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Distance to Shore line a continuous 99.59 69.48 0.09 196.41 
Lot sizea continuous 1.16 2.9 0.03 33.75 
Tenure in home continuous 17.24 15.17 1 93 
Race binary 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Income binary     
  Lower  0.27 0.44 0 1 
  Middle  0.29 0.45 0 1 
  Higher  0.39 0.49 0 1 
Education Binary 0.77 0.42 0 1 
a In the econometric analysis, the variable is log transformed 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Price Effects and Heterogeneity by Timing 
 
Results from the base regression estimation outlined in Equation (2.2a) are presented in table 
2.3.8 As predicted, results show a negative and significant relationship between Before hurricane 
event and the decision to accept acquisition. Specifically, we find that homeowners are 51% less 
likely to accept acquisition contracts presented to them before a hurricane event compared to 
after, ceteris paribus. This is intuitive because households’ decision to relocate from flood risk 
areas are mostly triggered after experiencing a damaging event. This preference can be translated 
 
8 Logit gives similar results in this case. 
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to dollar values by calculating homeowner WTA values9 before and after a damaging event for 
the average respondent in the sample. Homeowners being less likely to accept a buyout offer 
before damage occurs suggests that WTA values should be higher before a flood event, and this 
is borne out in the data. WTA for the mean respondent is 100.35% of the value of the home if the 
offer is made after damage to the home (with a 95% confidence interval of 92.66–108.04) 
compared with 113.43% if the offer is made before damage to the home (with a 95% confidence 
interval of 107.52–119.34). Standard errors for these estimates are generated using bootstrapping 
with 1000 replications. 
As one would expect, both price variables indicate that higher payments lead to higher 
acceptance rates. We further find respondents are more sensitive to price changes before 
hurricane events than after. The marginal effect for price before a hurricane event indicates that a 
1% increase in price increases the likelihood of accepting acquisition contracts offered before a 
hurricane event by 2% while the marginal effect of a 1% price increase after a hurricane event 
increases the likelihood of acceptance by 1%.  
Regarding homeowner and property characteristics, surprisingly, the coefficient on 
Floodplain is negative and significant. We hypothesized a positive relationship. That is, 
homeowners in a floodplain are 17% less likely to accept an acquisition offer compared to 
homeowners located outside floodplain. Robinson, et al. (2018) found a positive relationship 
between location of a property in floodplain and acquisition acceptance. This result may be due 
to moral hazard where homes in floodplains are required to carry flood insurance if financed by a 
 
9 Using notation from Equation 2.2a, the formula for estimating WTA is as follows: 
Before a hurricane event: WTA = 
𝑿𝒊𝜷 + 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝜃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 








federally backed mortgage. As hypothesized, the coefficient on Distance to coastline is negative 
and significant. Specifically, we find that for a 1% increase in the Distance to coastline, 
homeowners are 4% less likely to accept acquisition, ceteris paribus. This finding lends support 
to that of Zavar, Hagelman, and Rugeley (2012) who also find a negative relationship. The 
coefficient on Lot size is negative and significant, with a 1% increase in Lot size reducing 
homeowner acceptance probability by 6%. Our results on Lot size differ from those of Zavar, 
Hagelman, and Rugeley (2012), who find no relationship between total area of parcel and 
decision to relocate. 
We find the relationship between Tenure in home and the likelihood of accepting 
acquisition is negative as hypothesized. For every additional year of Tenure in home, 
homeowners are 1% less likely to accept acquisition. Fraser, Dodyle, and Young (2006), Fraser, 
De Vries, and Young (2006), and Kick, et al. (2011) also find a negative relationship between 
attachment to place and decision to relocate. Contrary to our expectations, and to Fraser, De 
Vries, and Young (2006), who find a negative relationship, we find no significant effect of 
income on the likelihood of accepting acquisition. The coefficient on Race is positive and 
significant. That is, ceteris paribus, white homeowners are 12% more likely to accept acquisition 
offers. Our result on Race is consistent with that of Robinson, et al. (2018) who also found that 
non-white homeowners are less likely to accept acquisition contracts compared to white 
homeowners.  
Using the model from Table 2.3, we take the following steps to construct homeowner 
supply curves. First, for each observation we generate a predicted probability of accepting the 
buyout contract. We then calculate the average probability of acceptance in the data at different 
price levels. Our econometric design allows for the specification of two different supply curves, 
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one pertaining to offers made before hurricane damage occurs and one pertaining to offers made 
after the property suffers hurricane damage. Figure 2.3 displays these supply curves. As 
indicated in the model, both curves are upward sloping, and the quantity supplied is greater after 
a hurricane event for all offered prices. 
 
Table 2.3: Probit regression results 
Variables Coefficients Standard Errors Marginal effects 
Before hurricane event -2.16*** 0.42 -0.51 
Before hurricane event × price  0.06*** 0.004  0.02 
After hurricane event × price  0.04*** 0.004  0.01 
Floodplain -0.62** 0.29 -0.17 
log (Distance) -0.21** 0.06 -0.04 
log (Lot size) -0.20** 0.08 -0.06 
Tenure in home -0.01* 0.01 -0.003 
Race  0.43** 0.22  0.12 
Income    
  Lower -0.09 0.19 -0.03 
  Higher -0.20 0.34 -0.06 
Education  0.28 0.20  0.08 
    
Constant -3.66*** 0.57  
    
Pseudo R2  0.29   
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance. Standard 
errors are robust clustered for 172 clusters in identifier (id), and number of observations = 1519. 
For binary variables, marginal effects are calculated as the discrete change from the base. For 
continuous variables, marginal effects are calculated as a unit change in the variable.  
 
 
To test for whether these differences are statistically significant, we take the difference in 
quantity supplied (i.e., average probability of acceptance in the data) at a given price point. We 
then estimate standard errors and calculate P values for this difference using bootstrapping with 
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1,000 replications. In this formulation, the null hypothesis is that quantity supplied is equal for 
the two groups (before- and after-hurricane) at a given price point. P values for each price point, 
presented in Table 2.4, indicate the supply curves are different from each other at all price points.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Likelihood of accepting acquisition, by timing (Damage State)  
                                                                                                                           
 
Table 2.4: Differences in quantity supplied, by timing 
Price 75 90 100 110 125 
Before = 
After 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Notes: Reported values are p values for a test of equality between the two quantities. Bolded 
values indicated P values of 0.05 or less. Price is measured as a percentage of pre-damage fair 
market value for the home. Before stands for individuals considering their house before any 
damage. After stands for individuals considering their house after damage has occurred.  
 
Heterogeneity by Homeowner and Property Characteristics 
 
We next turn to our models that allow for heterogeneity by both timing and other homeowner 
and property characteristics, outlined by Equation (2.2b). Coefficient estimates for all five 























property supply curves differentiated by race, tenure, education, and floodplain, respectively and 
whether these curves exhibit heterogeneity. We also explored income heterogeneity, finding 
mixed results that indicated no clear-cut relationship (see Figure 2.8 and Table 2.9).  Each figure 
is matched with a table presenting P values for tests of equality between supply curves at 
different payment offers. As with the previous model, all standard errors are generated using 
bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.        
 Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5 demonstrate that we find no statistical difference in supply 
curves by race for contracts offered before a hurricane event. For contracts offered after a 
hurricane event, we find no difference in supply curves at payment offers of 75% and 90% of 
pre-damage property value, but at offers of 100% or more we find higher supply values for 
whites than non-whites. We also note that whites are more likely to accept contracts after a 
hurricane event at all prices compared to before a hurricane event. On the other hand, for non-
whites, we find that the before and after event supply curves tend to converge at higher prices 
with no significant difference in the before-after comparison for the highest price level of 125% 
of pre-damage market value.  
 
 































Table 2.5: Differences in quantity supplied, by race and timing 












75 0.000 0.804 0.029 0.000 0.366 0.005 
90 0.000 0.697 0.075 0.000 0.055 0.003 
100 0.000 0.336 0.412 0.000 0.017 0.016 
110 0.000 0.165 0.803 0.000 0.015 0.019 
125 0.001 0.125 0.218 0.014 0.037 0.680 
Notes: Reported values are P values for a test of equality between the two quantities. Bolded values 
indicated P values of 0.05 or less. Price is measured as a percentage of pre-damage fair market 
value for the home. W_B stands for white individuals, considering their house before any damage. 
W_A stands for white individuals, considering their house after damage has occurred. NW_B 
stands for non-white individuals, considering their house before any damage. NW_A stands for 
nonwhite individuals, considering their house after damage has occurred. 
 
Concerning home tenure (Figure 2.5 and Table 2.6), results show that heterogeneity 
exists, and further that the type of heterogeneity differs at low and high price offers. At low price 
levels, the heterogeneity is entirely driven by timing, with long- and short-tenure homeowners 
exhibiting similar behaviors. At higher offers, however, the heterogeneity changes. Specifically, 
we find that long-tenured homeowners receiving an offer before damage occurs are more 
hesitant to agree to contracts, while long-tenured owners after damage and all short-tenure 
homeowners (both before and after damage) all behave relatively similarly. It appears that short 
tenure homeowners are more price sensitive and willing to extract capital gains at 125% of 





Figure 2.5: Likelihood of accepting acquisition, by tenure and timing 
 
 
Table 2.6: Differences in quantity supplied, by tenure and timing 












75 0.000 0.743 0.000 0.000 0.787 0.000 
90 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.000 0.284 0.000 
100 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.012 0.137 0.000 
110 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.442 0.095 0.001 
125 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.413 0.094 0.297 
Notes: Reported values are P values for a test of equality between the two quantities. Bolded 
values indicated P values of 0.05 or less. Price is measured as a percentage of pre-damage fair 
market value for the home. 10+_B stands for individuals who have lived in their home for ten 
years or more, considering their house before any damage. 10+_A stands for individuals who 
have lived in their home for ten years or more, considering their house after damage has 
occurred. <10_B stands for individuals who have lived in their home for less than ten years, 
considering their house before any damage. <10_A stands for individuals who have lived in their 
home for less than ten years, considering their house after damage has occurred. 
 
Figure 2.6 and Table 2.7 show the likelihood of accepting acquisition offers by education 
































accept offers than individuals with at least a college degree. However, further accounting for 
timing heterogeneity leads to an interesting pattern. At low offer levels, more educated 
homeowners receiving offers after damage occurs are far more likely to accept, with other 
groups (all non-college graduates and college graduates receiving offers before damage occurs) 
behaving similarly. As prices rise, we find two groups – college graduates being offered buyouts 
before damage and non-college graduates being offered after damage – are much more 
responsive to price increases than their counterparts. As a result, at highest offers we find the 
group of non-college graduates being offered before damage becomes an outlier, with 
substantially lower likelihood of accepting offers compared with the other three groups.  
 
 
























































75 0.000 0.088 0.084 0.001 0.001 0.991 
90 0.000 0.374 0.105 0.000 0.001 0.230 
100 0.000 0.744 0.278 0.000 0.006 0.025 
110 0.000 0.127 0.734 0.000 0.043 0.004 
125 0.040 0.017 0.620 0.003 0.218 0.005 
Notes: Reported values are P values for a test of equality between the two quantities. Bolded 
values indicated P values of 0.05 or less. Price is measured as a percentage of pre-damage fair 
market value for the home. C_Before stands for individuals with educational attainment of a 
college degree or higher, considering their house before any damage. C_After stands for 
individuals with educational attainment of a college degree or higher, considering their house 
after damage has occurred. NC_Before stands for individuals with educational attainment of less 
than a college degree, considering their house before any damage. NC_After stands for 
individuals with educational attainment of less than a college degree, considering their house 
after damage has occurred.          
 
 Figure 2.7 and Table 2.8 present supply curves differentiated by presence in the 
floodplain and timing. We find no significant difference in quantity supplied by homeowners in 
floodplain and those outside floodplain after hurricane damage occurs. Indeed, the supply curves 
are almost identical. Referring back to wording of the survey question, homeowners are asked to 
imagine that their home has been seriously damaged by a hurricane. In this case, perceived risk 
associated with residing in a floodplain may be overshadowed by the added information that 
damage has occurred. This may be interpreted as base rate neglect where respondents 
contemplate recent evidence and ignore the underlying probability of damage (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973). We similarly find no difference by floodplain before damage occurs, though it 
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appears that homeowners outside the floodplain are more responsive to price changes than 
homeowners in the floodplain. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Likelihood of accepting acquisition, by floodplain and timing 
 
 
Table 2.8: Differences in quantity supplied, by floodplain and timing 












75 0.045 0.442 0.000 0.059 0.877 0.000 
90 0.008 0.219 0.000 0.036 1.000 0.000 
100 0.003 0.284 0.000 0.066 0.932 0.000 
110 0.003 0.284 0.014 0.144 0.884 0.000 
125 0.075 0.385 0.199 0.420 0.847 0.010 
Notes: Reported values are P values for a test of equality between the two quantities. Bolded 
values indicated P values of 0.05 or less. Price is measured as a percentage of pre-damage fair 
market value for the home. F_Before stands for individuals with homes in floodplain, 
considering their house before any damage. F_After stands for individuals with homes in 
floodplain, considering their house after damage has occurred. NF_Before stands for individuals 
with homes in floodplain, considering their house before any damage. NF_After stands for 































Figure 2.8 and Table 2.9 present supply curves differentiated by income categories. The 
supply curves are almost identical. That is, we find no significant difference between quantity 
supplied income categories. However, interacting income categories with timing heterogeneity, 
we find significant difference in quantity supplied for homeowners with low income before and 
after a damaging event. The significant difference is also observed for middle income 
homeowners and higher income homeowners. Nevertheless, across income categories and timing 
heterogeneity, the difference in quantity supplied is limited. Table 2.10A presents estimated 
coefficients for the various models considered in this chapter. 
 
Figure 2.8: Likelihood of accepting acquisition, by income category and timing 
 
 



































75 0.061 0.206 0.208 0.001 0.000 0.043 0.078 0.457 0.000 
90 0.004 0.395 0.447 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.093 0.215 0.000 
100 0.001 0.784 0.915 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.174 0.176 0.000 
110 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.036 0.352 0.192 0.000 




































Table 2.9 Continued 












75 0.000 0.985 0.000 0.019 0.020 0.000 
90 0.000 0.914 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.000 
100 0.000 0.843 0.000 0.031 0.034 0.000 
110 0.000 0.021 0.021 0.203 0.225 0.000 
125 0.274 0.816 0.451 0.750 0.906 0.062 
Notes: Reported values are P values for a test of equality between the two quantities. Bolded 
values indicated P values of 0.05 or less. Price is measured as a percentage of pre-damage fair 
market value for the home. L_Before stands for individuals with annual income less than 
$50,000, considering their house before damage. L_After stands for individuals with annual 
income less than $50,000, considering their house after damage has occurred. M_Before stands 
for individuals with annual income greater than $49,999 but less than $100,000, considering their 
house before damage. M_After stands for individuals with annual income greater than $49,999 
but less than $100,000, considering their house after damage has occurred. H_Before stands for 
individuals with annual income greater than $99,999, considering their house before damage. 
H_After stands for individuals with annual income greater than $99,999, considering their house 
after damage has occurred. 
 
Robustness Check: Interval Regression 
 
To this point, our analysis has considered data in long format, where each observation is a 
binary choice between accepting and rejecting a specific buyout offer. It is often the case that 
analyses, such as this one, relying on small samples can be prone to narrow results that fail to 
hold up to robustness checks. To test whether our results exhibit this tendency, we consider an 
alternative modeling procedure. We use the bid value at which respondents first say they will 
accept a buyout offer to construct an interval for respondent WTA. This results in a wide data 
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format where five binary yes/no decisions are condensed into a single WTA interval observation. 
We follow the payment card literature (Welsh and Poe 1998; Cameron and Hupper 1989) and 
estimate a series of panel10 interval regressions that mirror the probit regressions in Table 2.10A. 
Table 2.11A shows these results. These results appear less statistically significant than their 
probit counterparts, but in terms of the major contribution of this article they are remarkably 
similar. Specifically, the primary takeaways from our probit models are (i) offered price matters 
and (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in willingness to accept an offer as well as price 
sensitivity by timing of the offer and home- and homeowner characteristics. As the dependent 
variable in the interval regression is WTA, it is not possible to include price as an explanatory 
variable. As such, takeaway (i) cannot be directly tested using the interval regression model. Our 
finding of substantial heterogeneity, however, is directly testable and is confirmed in the interval 
regression models. As with the probit models, each interval regression model beyond the base 
model generates four11 potentially heterogeneous groups, and comparing these groups allows for 
six unique comparisons. In all models included in Table 2.11A, we reject the null hypothesis that 
the groups are the same at the 90% confidence level in at least four of the six comparisons. This 
is clear evidence of preference heterogeneity and suggests that our probit findings are robust to 
other model specifications. It is also noteworthy that the interval regression generates similar 
estimates of household WTA for a buyout program (108.22% after damage; 118.70% before 




10 The data is still a panel in this setting, as each respondent will have a WTA interval for before damage and after 
damage occurrences. 
11 As an example, in the second column of table 2.10A, we allow for heterogeneity by race. The four groups 
generated are white homeowners being offered a buyout before damage, white homeowners being offered a buyout 
after damage, nonwhite homeowners being offered a buyout before damage, and nonwhite homeowners being 





While numerous previous studies examine what factors make homeowners more willing to 
accept government acquisition contracts for at-risk properties, the role of price has been largely 
ignored and no studies exist that account for heterogeneous price impacts. We present an 
empirical analysis of home price compensation effects on willingness to accept government 
acquisition contracts using a mail survey of homeowners in eastern North Carolina. We estimate 
pooled probit models to link hypothetical home price offers to a homeowner’s acquisition 
decision while controlling for a host of other covariates. Using these models, we derive 
probabilities of accepting acquisition contracts for various compensation levels, allowing us to 
construct property buyout supply curves. We then use a block bootstrap methodology to estimate 
standard errors, which allow us to test whether supply heterogeneity exists along multiple 
homeowner and property characteristics.  
Results show the expected positive relationship between price and homeowners’ decision 
to accept a government acquisition contract. We also find that non-price characteristics influence 
buyout acceptance in two ways. First, they influence ceteris paribus willingness to accept offers. 
This effect is emphasized in the literature. Additionally, we find that price responsiveness varies 
based on these non-price characteristics. We detail how non-price characteristics lead to 
heterogeneous willingness to accept buyout offers, with the timing of the offer (before or after 
damage to the house has occurred) exhibiting the sharpest heterogeneity.  
Our findings suggest that acquisition programs may want to consider increasing home 
price incentives to motivate more homeowners to sell their at-risk houses and relocate to lower-
risk areas. Additionally, implementation of buyout programs on a continuous basis instead of an 
episodic basis warrants further study. The findings indicate that at higher home price offers, it 
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may not matter whether acquisition contracts are presented to homeowners before or after a 
hurricane event. Removing property and residents from high flood risk areas prior to a 
catastrophic flood event can save lives and reduce government expenditure on recovery. Further, 
damaging hurricanes that destroy a portion of a region’s housing stock create a supply side shock 
that can temporally inflate prices of the existing undamaged stock making relocation difficult. 
For these reasons, it may be welfare improving if acquisition offers are made before a hurricane 
event, barring perverse location incentive effects. What is clear is that stakeholders and policy 
makers should consider prices as key determinants of homeowner decision-making when 
designing acquisition contracts.   
It is important to note that our study’s focus on coastal North Carolina, combined with 
the small sample used in our analysis and low response rates to the survey, suggests that further 
work in this area would be useful to increase confidence in the generalizability of our findings. 
Future research should expand our survey sample to encompass a wider study area to test the 
generalizability of our results to other flood-prone regions.12 Furthermore, future work would 
benefit from explicitly accounting for issues of consequentiality of the survey responses. These 
findings can also be embedded in larger integrated models that include homeowners, insurers, 
reinsurance, and government as stakeholders. Similar integrated models have been used to study 
 
12 A referee noted that it is possible for consequentiality to vary by respondent characteristics. For example, 
homeowners who live in the floodplain may find acquisition questions more consequential than those that live 
outside the floodplain. While this is certainly possible and our lack of consequentiality questions leaves us unable to 
definitively rule it out, we would suggest anecdotally that in a study area like the coastal plain of North Carolina, 
which has experienced multiple large-scale flood events in recent decades, the recognition of flood risk is high even 
among homeowners who do not live in the 100-year flood zone (partly due to the fact that damage is not restricted to 
this zone during catastrophic flood events). More empirically, it is difficult to argue that the pattern we find in the 
data (differences between before- and after-damage supply curves for those within the floodplain, differences 
between within- and outside-floodplain supply curves for offers before damage, and no difference between without- 
and outside-floodplain supply curves for offers after damage) would be driven by respondents outside the flood 
plain viewing the survey as largely inconsequential or less consequential than those inside the floodplain. Such an 
explanation is, to the authors, difficult to construct. 
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the effect on all stakeholders of a private voluntary market for catastrophe insurance, insurer 
competition, insurance affordability, and retrofit choices (Kesete et al. 2014; Peng et al. 2014; 
Gao et al. 2016; Shan et al. 2017; Jasour et al. 2018; Xu et al. 2018). This wider perspective 
would allow researchers to analyze the combined effects of acquisition, retrofit, and insurance 
actions on regional risk. 
 
CHAPTER 3 : HOMEOWNER PREFERENCE FOR HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL FLOOD 





For decades the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which manages the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), has offered a portfolio of flood risk mitigation options to high-
risk homeowners to choose from, hoping to reduce flood damages or better still remove the most 
—at-risk properties from the housing stock. Buyout (home acquisition) and home retrofit (e.g., 
home elevation) are potential candidates available to homeowners. In recent times, FEMA has 
increased its buyout efforts, including proposing to allow homeowners to rebuild on the same lot 
after the buyout. While studies exist on factors affecting homeowners’ decisions to participate in 
buyouts, no study has examined how proposed changes coupled with availability of alternative 
mitigation options like home elevation will affect participation. This chapter fills the gap by 
examining homeowners’ stated preference for buyout and home elevation contract attributes 
using data from a discrete choice experiment. Results indicate that factors that influence the 
decision to participate in home acquisition include the price offered for home acquisition, 
whether the homeowner is permitted to rebuild on the same lot after the current home is torn 
down, the number of days that will elapse between the signing of the contract and when the 
homeowner can expect to be paid, and number of days the homeowner is given to vacate the 
property. Factors that influence the elevation decision include the cost of elevating the home, the 
size of elevation subsidies, and future insurance premium rate appreciation. Overall, we also find 
 
13 With Gregory Howard and Jamie Kruse. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under 
collaborative awards #1433622 and #1856256. The statements, findings, and conclusions are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
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that the effects vary with the timing (whether the contract is offered before or after a damage 




The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the most subscribed public disaster program 
tasked with disaster preparedness and recovery in the US. Yet, the program is challenged with 
solvency issues partly due to program design.14 Currently, the program has accumulated debt 
exceeding $20 billion (Congressional Research Service 2019) and efforts to achieve solvency 
through risk-based premium rate structures have met public resistance, rolling back proposed 
rates increases (Frimpong, et al. 2019). Consequently, this has raised concerns about program 
performance and sustainability.        
 In lieu of risk-based premium rate structures, and after it became clear that sea walls, 
levees, dams and the like can and should not be used in all cases to reduce risk exposure (Fan 
and Davlasheridze, 2016), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is increasingly 
using government buyouts (home acquisition) to address NFIP’s solvency challenges. Buyouts 
are government efforts to buy and retire severely (about 50%) damaged or repetitive loss 
properties or relocate said properties to areas with lower flood risk. The program is partly (75%) 
funded by FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), with the remaining 25% 
supported by either local government, non-governmental agencies or the homeowners 
themselves (FEMA 2015). Buyouts are usually initiated after a presidential disaster declaration 
and homeowner participation in the program is voluntary. Alternatively, homeowners may 
 
14 NFIP is not actuarially sound for several reasons. The program, for example is not structured to build a capital 
surplus; cannot deny policies to high-risk applicants, neither can it deny insurance because of frequent losses. It is 
also subject to statutory limits on rate increases and its premium rates do not reflect actual flood risk (GAO 2010).  
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benefit from programs such as the Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) program, which 
subsidizes home elevation. Home elevation involves raising structures on either stilts, mounds, 
concrete pillars or foundations to an elevation at Base Flood Elevation or higher (FEMA 2015). 
 To encourage buyout program participation, policy makers are considering programmatic 
changes. The proposed changes will potentially allow homeowners to retain ownership of the 
deed-restricted lot and build new structures so long as they meet current local building codes 
(Flavelle 2018). Also, the program may potentially be allowed to run on a continuous basis and 
not only after a presidential disaster declaration in an area. While these proposed changes could 
impact buyout participation, there are no empirical studies evaluating the impact of such policy 
changes.            
 This chapter investigates predominantly coastal US residential homeowners’ stated 
preferences for buyout and home elevation contract attributes, and estimates the average 
willingness to accept values for buyout and home elevation contracts. Given the proposed 
changes to buyout programs, this study examines attributes including property pricing, retained 
ownership of the deed-restricted lot, timing of the transaction, and contract options that include 
future flood insurance pricing, home elevation cost, and subsidies.    
 Within the flood risk mitigation literature, relatively few studies have examined factors 
that influence an individual’s decision to participate in buyouts, and have mostly focused on the 
effects of demographic and geospatial factors on participation decision (Fraser, et al. 2003; 
Fraser, Doyle, and Young 2006; Fraser, De Vries, and Young 2006; Kick et al. 2011; De Vries 
and Fraser 2012; Zavar, Hagelman, and Rugeley 2012; Bukvic, et al. 2015; Robinson, et al. 
2018; Frimpong, et al 2019). Frimpong, et al. (2019) examined the effect of offered price on 
homeowners’ decision to participate in buyouts using a contingent valuation survey of 123 
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homeowners in Eastern North Carolina. Other studies have also focused on the effect of 
demographic and geospatial factors on individual’s decisions to buy flood insurance (Baumann 
and Sims 1978; Browne and Hoyt 2000; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010; Kousky 2010; 
Gallagher 2014; Kriesel and Landry 2004; Landry and Jahan-Parver 2011; Petrolia, Landry, and 
Coble 2013), , or elevate their homes (Botzen, Aerts, and van den Bergh 2012). In this chapter, I 
use a much larger national sample of coastal properties and builds on past studies by expanding 
the list of attributes related to buyout and home elevation contracts. I additionally examine the 
impact of future insurance premium pricing on homeowners’ decision to engage in mitigation 
options. This analysis further allows for the quantification of tradeoffs between different 
subsidized risk mitigation activities.         
 Results indicate that homeowners prefer buyout contracts that offer larger payments, give 
homeowners more time before they must vacate the property, and reduce the lag time between 
signing of the contract and payment to the homeowner. Perhaps surprisingly, homeowners do not 
put a premium on being able to retain the lot. Regarding elevation, homeowners unsurprisingly 
prefer contracts with lower elevation costs and higher elevation subsidies. I also ask respondents 
to consider their house as-is (pre-damage) in some choices, while in other choices I ask 
respondents to imagine their house was recently damaged by a flood event. I find not only that 
general preferences for buyout contracts vary with the timing of the contract (whether it is 
offered before or after a flood damage event), but further that preferences for specific attributes 
also vary with timing of the contract offered.       
 The next section presents policy background with details on the NFIP, buyouts, and 
structure elevation. The third section describes the survey and experimental design and data used 
for the discrete choice analysis. Section four presents the theoretical foundation and econometric 
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model used in the analysis. Regression results and discussion are presented in the fifth section, 




National Flood Insurance Program 
 
To provide access to affordable federally backed flood insurance and to encourage community-
level flood risk mitigation, the US congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act of 1969 that 
created the NFIP (FEMA 2019a). Community-level participation in NFIP is voluntary and only 
residents and businesses of participating communities can buy flood insurance policies. 
Participating communities adopt floodplain management ordinances and are encouraged to 
exceed minimum mitigation efforts.         
 Currently, the NFIP is the most widely used adaptation strategy among residents 
(Thomas and Leichencko 2011) with over 22,000 participating communities and over 5 million 
policies-in-force (Congressional Research Service 2019). Private insurance companies write 
policies, but the federal government is responsible for paying damage claims. NFIP’s policy 
coverage is limited to structure and contents, with limits of $250,000 and $100,000, respectively 
for single-family building and up to 500,000 for other residential or non-residential building 
(FEMA 2020). Flood insurance premium rates are determined mainly by Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps (FIRMs) which are updated periodically. Other factors that affect premiums are, whether 
the structure is elevated above historic flood-levels and the extent to which the community 
participate in the community rating system (Frimpong et al. 2020). As such, the assessed flood-
risk level for a structure can change when new FIRMs take effect. However, policy holders with 
continuous coverage whose flood risk-levels have increased are not affected by the post-FIRM 
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insurance premium rates. This rule is also referred to as grandfathering (FEMA 2016). As a 
result, premiums may not reflect current flood risk.      
 Since its inception, NFIP has seen several reforms to bolster the effectiveness of the 
program. The Flood Insurance Protection Act of 1973 and The National Flood Insurance Reform 
Act of 1994 were enacted to encourage NFIP enrollment, and The Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 2004 was intended to encourage flood risk reduction. In 2012, the Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act was introduced to bolster the financial health of NFIP by increasing 
premium rates but was later repealed and replaced with The Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 (FEMA 2019b). To date, the program has borrowed over $20 billion 
dollars from the US Treasury to meet its claim payments obligations (Congressional Research 
Service 2019), making it a financially “high risk” public disaster program.    
 To complement community-level flood risk mitigation efforts, FEMA has introduced 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to assist states and local communities in reducing 




Among the host of potential risk mitigation measures that homeowners could pursue for natural 
disasters, buyout is by far the most effective way of eliminating future flood risk. Buyout 
programs pay homeowners to sell high-risk property to the government for demolishing or 
relocating the structure to an area with lower flood risk. The program is funded through FEMA’s 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), a component of the Hazard Mitigation Assistance 
(HMA) and is authorized by Section 404 of the Stafford Act, 42 U. S. C.5170c (FEMA 2015). 
Local governments (states and territories), and federally recognized tribes may apply for 
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FEMA’s HMGP funds to be used for buyouts (FEMA 2015), but only after there is a presidential 
disaster declaration. Prior to local authorities implementing buyouts, a benefit–cost analysis is 
used to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the acquisition (FEMA 2005). Contracts are 
voluntary, so individual homeowners may choose to accept or reject offers made by local 
authorities. Once a contract is agreed upon, the said structure is demolished or relocated if 
possible and the cleared lot is typically left as open space or converted to a recreational area 
(FEMA 2005).         
 Buyouts gained popularity after the Great Midwest Floods in 1993, where communities 
like Cherokee and Story County in Iowa acquired 157 and 28 properties, respectively (FEMA 
2011). Since then several other communities have benefitted from the HMGP. After the 1997 
floods, Grand Forks, North Dakota bought approximately 800 properties. A year later, San 
Antonio, Texas, acquired 400 properties to reduce future flood risk, and after Hurricanes Fran 
and Floyd in 1999, about 1,150 properties were bought in Greenville and Kinston, North 
Carolina (De Vries and Fraser 2012; Frimpong, et al. 2019).      
 In addition to eliminating future flood risk to properties and lives, buyouts have several 
other advantages. Barnhizer (2003) mentions that for every $1 the government invests in the 
buyout, homeowners who participate save $2 in future flood insurance premia. This makes the 
buyout program a win-win for both parties. Again, the program provides an opportunity for 
homeowners to financially protect against decreased home values in the wake of a flood event 
(Greer and Binder 2017; Frimpong, et al. 2019). Federal and local governments, on the other 
hand, could potentially save on future flood related expenditures when an area is cleared of 
flood-prone structures (Barnhizer 2003). Buyout benefits could accrue to society as the resulting 
open space could serve as recreational grounds (e.g., fishing and hunting, boating, and hiking) 
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(Barnhizer 2003). Further, the open space could potentially help mitigate future floods (Brody 
and Highfield 2013) which may in turn increase adjacent property values Barnhizer (2003). 
 
Structure/ Home Elevation 
 
For communities participating in NFIP, potential policy holders with structures at risk of flood 
damage are required to raise their structure above the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) (100-year 
flood elevation) (FEMA 2015). Homeowners are also encouraged to incorporate freeboard 
requirements into elevation. Freeboard is an additional height (usually 1 foot) above the BFE. 
There are three basic ways to elevate a house: raising the structure on piers or piles; on a mound; 
and on a tall foundation (FEMA 2015). Location, size, quality of materials and construction, 
complexity of details, site constraints, utility requirements, systems requirements, development 
and permitting fees, and general market and economic conditions are all factors that influence 
whether a structure can be elevated. The cost of elevating structures varies based on the size of 
the structure. For a medium-sized brick or concreate slab house, the cost of elevating the house is 
estimated at $30,000 (FEMA 2005).        
 Elevation incentives are available to homeowners through mitigation grant programs such 
as the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA)) and Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM). As elevation reduces flood risk, homeowners with elevated 
houses often benefit from lower flood insurance premiums (FEMA 2015).  
  
Survey and Data 
 
The survey is in five sections. The first section presents respondents with a consent form, 
followed by screening questions. The third section collects data on homeowners’ history in the 
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community, experiences on flooding and thoughts on flood risk. The fourth section comprise a 
series of hypothetical choice scenarios regarding flood risk mitigation and the final section 
collects household-level data on homeowner demographic characteristics and property address 
information. Property address information are used to access characteristics of the property and 
location in, for example, floodplain. I explain the choice experiment design next. Sample of the 
survey instrument is relegated to the appendix of the dissertation.  
 
Choice Experiment Design 
 
I use a discrete choice experiment15 to elicit homeowners’ preference for buyout, house 
elevation, and a status quo depicting flood insurance premium appreciation. The flood 
mitigation scenarios are hypothetical and vary along several attributes as shown in Table 3.1.  
For the buyout contract, attributes include what is being sold (either the structure and the lot or 
just the structure), the price the homeowner will receive (as a percentage of the pre-damage fair 
market value of the property being sold16), how long it will take for the government to make the 
payment to the homeowner, and how long the homeowner has before they must vacate the 
property.            
 For home elevation contracts, attributes include the cost of elevating the house and the 
subsidy they will receive. The cost of elevating the house is measured as a percentage of the 
home’s value, while the size of the subsidy is measured as the percentage of the total cost of 
 
15 Discrete choice experiment is an attribute-based approach to gather stated preference data (Ryan, Gerard, and 
Amaya-Amaya 2008). With this approach, respondents are presented with a series of hypothetical scenarios that 
comprise two or more competing alternatives that vary along several attributes (Ryan, Gerard, and Amaya-Amaya 
2008), in addition to a status quo. The attribute levels are assumed to determine the value (utility) the alternative 
provides (Lancaster 1966). Given the attributes of interest and their levels, a choice set design method (e.g. Full 
factorial, Fractional factorial or Efficient design) is used to generate choice set scenarios (Louviere, Hensher, and 
Swait 2000).  
16 If the homeowner is selling only the house, this is measured as the value of only the house. If homeowner is 
selling both the house and the lot, this is measured as the value of the house and the lot combined. 
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elevating the house. Lastly, I also specify a value for how much the homeowner can expect their 
flood insurance premiums to rise. This attribute is expressed as a percentage increase relative to 
their current premium and is given different levels for the elevation contract and the status-quo17 
option of neither contract.         
 As many of these attributes are presented as percentages and may be confusing for some 
respondents, in the section of the survey that outlines the attributes respondents were presented 
with numeric examples to illustrate how different percentages would translate to dollar amounts 
(see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  
 
Table 3.1: Program attributes and levels 
Attribute Level 
Buyout  
What will you sell to the government 1=house and lot, 0=house only  
Price you will receive if you sell property 75%, 90%, 100%, 110%, and 125%  
How long it will take the government to pay  15 days, 45 days, 75 days, and 120 days  
You must vacate the house within this period  30 days, 60 days, 90 days, and 120 days  
  
Home elevation  
Cost to raise the house above ground  20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%  
Subsidy you will receive to raise house above 
ground  
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%  
How much your flood insurance premium will 
increase 




17 Subjects were given the same status-quo premium increase in all choices, while premium increases varied for 
different elevation policies. There was between-subject variation in status-quo premium increases, meaning different 

















Figure 3.2: Description of the house elevation contract attributes 
 
The choice experiment design is determined using SAS 9.3 experimental design macros 
(Kuhfeld 2010).18 The resulting design of 30 choice sets maximizes the D-efficiency (Scarpa and 
Rose 2008). I group the 30 choice sets into 15 blocks, each block containing two choice sets to 
limit cognitive strain on respondents, as there is evidence that hypothetical bias mitigation 
techniques can show reduced effectiveness after 4-5 choices (Howard, et al. 2017). Homeowners 
are shown four choice sets in a randomized fashion (2 of the 15 blocks). In this way, the order of 
choice set is not confounded with specific attribute levels in our analysis. In two choice sets, 
respondents are prompted to consider their house as it currently is, without damage from a flood 
 
18 They include %mktruns, %mktex, %mktroll, %choiceff, %mktdups, and %mktblock. 
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event. In the other two choice sets, homeowners are asked to assume a recent flood event has 
damaged their property when making their choice. The order of damaged scenarios is 
randomized. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows an example of the choice sets.  
 
 





Figure 3.4: Example of choice set homeowner evaluates assuming property is damaged by flood. 
 
 
Survey Administration  
 
A total of 1,366 residential homeowners responded to an online survey administered between 
August 2018 and April 2019. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of respondents’ properties in the 
study area. Based on respondents’ address information, majority (577 (42.24%)) have properties 
in the East Coast states (excluding Florida samples), 206 (15.08%) have properties in the Gulf 
Coast states (excluding Florida samples), 401 (29.36%) are in Florida, 99 (7.25%) are in West 
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Coast states, 43 (3.15%) are in the Great Lakes area, and 9 (0.66%) are in other places such as 
Hawaii. A total of 31 respondents’ addresses were not available for verification.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: A map of U.S. showing distribution of respondents’ property location 
 
 First, respondents provide consent to participate in the survey, followed by answering 
screening questions - homeowners who are at least 18 years old and have property within 150 
kilometers (about 93.2 miles) from the shoreline. This is followed by answering questions on 
their history in the community, experience with floods and perceptions of flood risk. 
Respondents were then presented a series of hypothetical choice scenarios regarding flood risk 
mitigation options for their coastal property to be evaluated. Each choice offered three options: a 
buyout contract, a home elevation contract, and a status-quo option of choosing neither contract 
(see Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for example of the choice set or scenarios). The survey ends with 
questions on a host of demographics.        
 Prior to evaluating the choice scenarios, respondents were introduced to the flood 
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mitigation programs with detailed description of the program attributes. First, respondents were 
told that, “The federal government through the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the impacts of flood hazards on residents and 
their property. These efforts include buying or relocating houses found in floodprone areas, 
elevating houses in floodprone areas, and making opportunities available to purchase flood 
insurance.” This statement is followed by the description of the buyout and home elevation 
contract attributes (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) as well as image of a property bought and torn down 
by local government (Buyout) and image of a property being elevated above ground (see Figures 
3.6 and 3.7). Finally, respondents were informed that, “Changes to the National Flood Insurance 
Program indicate that in the future flood insurance premiums in your area may increase by 
100%. Suppose your local government official has offered contracts to help reduce or eliminate 
flood risk in your community. In the next questions we would like to know whether you would 
be willing to enter into flood risk reduction programs”. Because respondents are known to 
respond to hypothetical questions differently than when faced with real life choices, we resort to 
using cheap talk technique19 to further mitigate hypothetical bias. Specifically, we mention in the 
survey that “We are interested in your true preferences. There are no right or wrong answers only 
what you would actually prefer. The questions are hypothetical, and research has shown that 
some people commit to actions in hypothetical situations that they would not actually commit to 
in real life. Please keep this in mind and do your best to answer the questions that follow as if 
they were real options being offered to you.” 
 
19 Cheap talk is an ex-ante approach to address hypothetical bias in the survey design stage where respondents are 
told that hypothetical bias is a significant problem and asked not to submit to this type of respondent error 











Figure 3.7: Example of a house being elevated above ground (House elevation program). Source: 





Empirical Model  
I begin the analysis with a random utility framework20 where utility is a function of a vector of 
contract attributes ijkX :  
.ij ijk ijU X e= +                (3.1) 
Where Uij is utility individual i derives for jth alternative contract,   is vector of parameters 
associated with k contract attributes, ijkX , and ije is the error term. With the assumption that the 
errors, ije , are independent and identically distributed and follow an extreme value type 1 
distribution, we utilize the standard conditional logit model.  
Of particular interest is evaluating whether preferences are substantially different when 
considering houses that are not currently damaged from a flood event. To explore any potential 
differences between damaged and undamaged houses, an indicator variable for whether a choice 
is made assuming the house is not damaged by a flood event (Before) or damaged by flood event 





ij k ijk ij ij
k
K
k ijk ij ij ij
k
U X Buyout Elevation Before






= + +  
 
 




     (3.2) 
where X is a vector of k attributes. k ,  ,  , k ,  , and  are parameters to be estimated. Table 
3.2 presents a description of the variables used in the regression analysis.    
 As a robustness check, I also estimate a random parameters model that accounts for 
 
20 See appendix for details on random utility theory. 
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potential heterogeneity in homeowner preferences. Further, I estimate a series of conditional 
logit models that considers (1) subsamples of the data -respondents with property within 49 
kilometers (about 30 miles) from the shoreline, homeowners in East and Gulf Coast states, 
permanent residents, and single-family homes, (2) interaction terms - interacting respondents 
sociodemographic characteristic with attributes. Except for the results on the random parameters 
logit, the rest of the robustness check results are presented in the appendix of this chapter.  
 
Table 3.2: Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
 Buyout 
Price × Before Price (% of pre-damage value of property) for buyout 
contracts offered before a flood event 
Price × After Price (% of pre-damage value of property) for buyout 
contracts offered before a flood event 
Sell both house and lot × Before Dummy equal to 1 if contract offered before flood event 
requires selling both house and lot  
Sell both house and lot × After Dummy equal to 1 if contract offered after flood event 
requires selling both house and lot 
Acquisition pay period × Before  Number of days to pay buyout participant for contract 
offered before flood event 
Acquisition pay period × After  Number of days to pay buyout participant for contract 
offered after flood event 
Vacate × Before Number of days to vacate property after contract offered 
before flood event is agreed upon 
Vacate × After Number of days to vacate property after contract offered 
before flood event is agreed upon 
 Home elevation 
Elevation cost × Before Cost (% of pre damage value of property) to elevate a home 
for elevation contract offered before flood event  
Elevation cost × After Cost (% of pre damage value of property) to elevate a home 
for elevation contract offered after flood event  
Elevation subsidy × Before Subsidy (% of cost of elevation) to elevate home for 
elevation contract offered before flood event 
Elevation subsidy × After Subsidy (% of cost of elevation) to elevate home for 
elevation contract offered after flood event 
Insurance appreciation × Before % increase in insurance premium for elevation contract 
offered before flood event 
Insurance appreciation × After % increase in insurance premium for elevation contract 




Table 3.2 Continued  
 Alternative Specific Constants (ASC) 
Buyout × Before Dummy equal 1 if alternative is buyout and contract is 
offered before flood event 
Buyout × After Dummy equal 1 if alternative is buyout and contract is 
offered after flood event 
Elevation × Before Dummy equal 1 if alternative is elevation and contract is 
offered before flood event 
Elevation × After Dummy equal 1 if alternative is elevation and contract is 
offered after flood event 
 
 
Policy Simulation: Average Compensating Variation (CV) 
 
Next, I adopt Hanemann’s (1984) average compensating variation (CV) framework to estimate 
the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) for a buyout and home elevation contract for the 
average homeowner in our sample. For each contract type, we generate two WTA estimates: one 
for a contract offered prior to damage and one for a contract offered after damage. The buyout 
contract, requires the homeowner to sell both house and lot, pay the homeowner in 365 days, and 
require the homeowner to vacate the property after 60 days. Home elevation contract would cost 
30% of the property’s value to elevate home. In all cases, the respondent has the option of 
choosing the status quo option, which carries with it an insurance premium rate increase of 50%. 
Conversely, choosing the elevation contract leads to a smaller premium increase of 30%. I repeat 
the policy simulation exercise while varying the attributes levels of the buyout contract to 
examine the welfare implications of different buyout contracts and present results in the 







= − −        (3.3) 
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where 1V  is the estimated utility of the contract, 0V  is the estimated utility of the status-quo 
option, and price  is the coefficient associated with the buyout transaction price. If a contract is 
offered after a house is damaged, we use price instead of price . When estimating the CV for 
buyout contract, I replace Elevation in Equation 3.2 with Status-quo ASC to measure the 
estimated utility for the status-quo. Likewise, I replace Buyout in Equation 3.2 with Status-quo 






Table 3.3 describes the demographics of our sample. The mean age of respondents is 
48.76 and majority have at least bachelor’s degree, are in the $50,000 - $99,999 income bracket, 
are white, are permanent residents, live in a single-family house, report their properties are in 
very good condition, have mortgage, and insurance. About 32% of the sample have experienced 
various degrees of property damage due to floods, 54% expect flooding in the next 10 years, and 
14% are in 100-year floodplain.        
 Presented in Table 3.4 are the counts of respondents’ preference for buyout, home 
elevation, and status quo (flood insurance appreciation). Regardless of the timing of the contracts 
(i.e., contracts offered before damage and after damage), majority of the respondents prefer 
 
21 Buyout contract offered before flood damage, 
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For contracts offered after flood damage I interact with After instead of Before. 
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buyout to the status quo, prefer home elevation to the status quo, and prefer buyout to home 
elevation contract. Although not reported, this is true across demographics.  
 
Table 3.3: Demographics of sample (N = 1,366 unless noted otherwise) 
Variable N Freq. % Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Age 1,363   48.76 17.09 18 92 
Education        
 Non formal   7 0.51     
 High school  378 27.67     
 Associate  292 21.38     
 Bachelors  464 33.97     
 Post-graduate  225 16.47     
Income 1,365       
 Lower (<$50,000)  490 35.87     
 Middle ($50,000 - $99,999)  592 43.34     
 Upper (>$99,999)  283 20.72     
Male  627 45.90     
White   1,022 74.82     
Residence type        
 Permanent  1,213 88.80     
 Seasonal  97 7.10     
 Other (own rental property)  56 4.10     
House type        
  Manufactured  100 7.32     
  Single family   1,075 78.70     
  Duplex/ townhouse  84 6.15     
  Apartment/condominium  97 7.10     
  Don’t know  10 0.73     
House Condition 1,365       
  Poor  10 0.73     
  Fair  100 7.33     
  Good  408 29.89     
  Very good  561 41.10     
  Excellent  286 20.95     
Attachment to place (%)        
  Personal  1,364   73.94 23.07 0 100 
  Family  1,361   75.54 24.32 0 100 
Tenure (years) 1,360   12.90 10.98 0 69 
Mortgage  791 57.91     
Flood Insurance 1,304 679 52.07     
Property damage experience  435 31.84     
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Table 3.3 Continued        
Percent damage 435       
  Less than 20%  109 25.06     
  20-39%  146 33.56     
  40-59%  114 26.21     
  60-79%  40 9.20     
  80-100%  26 5.98     
Expected % future damage 435       
  Less than 20%  95 21.84     
  20-39%  131 30.11     
  40-59%  111 25.52     
  60-79%  70 16.09     
  80-100%  28 6.44     
Next flooding within the next        
  5 years or less  485 35.51     
  10 years or less  254 18.59     
  25 years or less  110 8.05     
  100 years or more  115 8.42     
  I don’t know  402 29.43     
100-year floodplain 1,264 173 13.69     
 
Table 3.4: Summary of the respondents’ choices. 
 Buyout Home Elevation Neither 
Before 1,372 764 592 
After 1,442 776 513 
 
 
Estimated Coefficients of Conditional logit model  
 
Results from our estimated conditional logit model in Equation 3.2 are presented in Table 3.5. As 
one would expect, homeowners prefer buyout contracts that offer more money in exchange for 
the property, pay the homeowner more quickly, and allow more time for the homeowner to 
vacate the property. Further, there is no premium homeowners give to being able to retain the lot; 
indeed, I find that they would prefer to sell the lot with the house. These findings hold for both 
pre-damage and post-damage offers, though a test for difference in magnitude of the coefficients 
finds that Price × Before and Price × After are statistically different. Specifically, I find that 
homeowners are more sensitive to price changes before damage occurs compared with after 
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damage occurs. This finding is consistent with that of Frimpong et al. (2019). I find no other 
differences in contract timing for buyout contracts, except for the alternative specific constant for 
buyout.          
 Turning to elevation subsidies, as one would expect homeowners prefer contracts that 
offer larger subsidies. The model suggests that respondents also prefer elevation contracts with a 
lower cost of elevation, though this attribute is not statistically significant when contracts are 
offered after damage is suffered. As one would expect, homeowners prefer options that deliver 
lower levels of insurance premium appreciation, though surprisingly this effect is not statistically 
significant. One possible explanation for this relates to the sample. Almost half of respondents 
report that they do not carry flood insurance on their property; therefore insurance premium 
increases may be viewed as having no consequence. The coefficients on the interaction terms 
Buyout × Before, Buyout × After, Elevation × Before, and Elevation × After (the alternative 
specific constants) should be interpreted relative the base alternative (the status-quo). Only the 
coefficient on Buyout × Before is significant and negative, indicating buyout contracts offered 
prior to a flood damage event is significantly less preferred to the current policy that comes with 
potential increase in future insurance premium rate (after controlling for other attributes of the 
alternative).  
 
Estimated CV for Buyout and Elevation Contract Scenario 
 
Tables 3.6 presents point estimates and confidence intervals for WTA calculations. These values 
can be interpreted as the minimum willingness to accept compensation or the minimum cost to 
officials for offering the specified buyout or elevation contract to the average person. Officials 
would have to pay the average homeowner 118.5% (with a 95% confidence interval of 86.229 - 
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150.724) of the value of the property to incentivize the homeowner to accept the buyout contract 
for an undamaged property. This point estimate is slightly higher than that of Frimpong, et al. 
(2019) who showed a point estimate of 113.43%, though this is not an apples-to-apples 
comparison, as the current survey includes attributes that were absent in the choice experiment in 
Frimpong, et al. On the other hand, for a buyout contract offered after damage has occurred, 
WTA is 94.862% of the pre-damage value of the property (with a confidence interval of 41.599 - 
148.126). Frimpong, et al. (2019) report a similar but slightly higher point estimate (100.35%) 
than the current estimate (though the same caveats outlined above apply to this comparison). 
While the difference in WTA estimates prior to and after damage is fairly large (for a $200,000 
property, the difference exceeds $37,000), we find that the standard errors around these estimates 
are large enough for us to be unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal WTA values at 
standard confidence levels22 (p value = 0.220).        
 WTA for home elevation contracts are also displayed in Table 3.6. For elevation 
contracts offered prior to a home damaged by flood, officials will have to provide the average 
homeowner 40.186% of the total cost of elevating the home as a subsidy to motivate the 
homeowner to engage in home elevation. On the other hand, for elevation contracts offered after 
the home is damaged by flood the WTA is not statistically different from zero, implying that 
under the conditions of this contract no subsidy is needed. This may be a surprising result, but 
the reader must keep in mind that this contract includes the assumption that elevation will reduce 
premium increases from 50% to only 30%, so in this scenario elevation yields tangible rewards 
to the homeowner even without a subsidy. 
 
22 We test for differences by estimating the difference between these CV values and bootstrapping a standard error 
for this difference. Testing for differences between the two estimates, where the null hypothesis is CVBefore = CVAfter 
is equivalent to testing for whether their difference is equal to zero, or the null hypothesis CVDifference = 0 where 
CVDifference = CVBefore – CVAfter. 
68 
 
Table 3.5: Conditional logit regression results 
Variable Coefficient 
Price × Before 0.0179*** 
 (0.00222) 
Price × After 0.0113*** 
 (0.00211) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.189** 
 (0.0768) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.227*** 
 (0.0756) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00327*** 
 (0.000966) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00305*** 
 (0.000940) 
Vacate × Before 0.00355*** 
 (0.00112) 
Vacate × After 0.00388*** 
 (0.00110) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0149*** 
 (0.00413) 
Elevation cost × After -0.00187 
 (0.00408) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.0107*** 
 (0.00180) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00607*** 
 (0.00178) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00232 
 (0.00199) 
Insurance appreciation × After -8.14e-05 
 (0.00204) 
Buyout × Before -1.444*** 
 (0.309) 
Buyout × After -0.420 
 (0.303) 
Elevation × Before -0.0286 
 (0.180) 
Elevation × After 0.0738 
 (0.179) 
  
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 
Log pseudolikelihood -5487.2596 
Observations (Cluster id) 16,377 (1,366) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered by the 
respondent. 




Table 3.6: Results from the estimated compensation variation framework 
 Buyout Contract Elevation Contract 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Before 118.477%*** 86.229, 150.724 40.186%*** 23.495, 56.876 
 (16.453)  (8.516)  
After 94.862%*** 41.599, 148.126 -3.206% -104.881, 98.468 
 (27.176)  (51.876)  
Test for difference  23.61% -35.959, 83.188 43.392% -56.964, 143.747 
  (30.395)  (51.203)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01 
Buyout contract (for Before and After timing) comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell 
both house and lot (1); Acquisition pay period (365 days); Vacate (60 days). Home elevation 
contract: Elevation cost (50%); Insurance appreciation (30%). Replication based on 1,366 




Random Parameter Logit Model 
 
Following the growing literature on estimating discrete choice models that allow for unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences (Revelt and Train 1998; Train 2009), I also estimate the model in 
Equation 2 of this chapter as a random parameter logit (RPL) model with 1,000 Halton draws 
and present results in Table 3.7. RPL models assume that preferences for an attribute follow a 
specified distribution. In our case, I model normally distributed preferences for each attribute and 
estimate the mean and standard deviation of the preference distribution for each attribute. 
 The main findings of the conditional logit model are supported by the RPL. Further, the 
model gives some insights regarding the more curious findings from the conditional logit. For 
example, one would expect insurance premium increases to have a negative impact on utility. 
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While the conditional logit model has the correct sign for these coefficients, they are not 
statistically significant. In the RPL model, however, I find mean values to be negative and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, I find statistically significant standard deviations, 
suggesting that there is evidence of a spread in preferences. This lends credence to the theory 
that while some homeowners dislike premium hikes, others (likely those who don’t insure their 
home against flood events) are indifferent to these changes, leading to a spread of preferences in 
the sample. Lastly, there is evidence that there is greater preference heterogeneity for elevation 
programs than for buyout programs. While buyout programs have much larger (in absolute 
value) mean preference coefficients for their ASCs (-3.762 and -2.137 for buyouts compared 
with -0.356 and 0.113 for elevation), the ASCs for elevation have much larger estimated 
standard deviations, implying a greater spread of preferences. 
 
Table 3.7: Random parameter logit regression results 
Variable Mean Std. deviation 
Price × Before 0.0313*** -0.00145 
 (0.00474) (0.00273) 
Price × After 0.0215*** 0.00306 
 (0.00398) (0.00454) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.284** -0.249 
 (0.128) (1.089) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.403*** -0.484 
 (0.129) (0.569) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00415*** -0.00535 
 (0.00159) (0.0129) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00482*** -0.0100** 
 (0.00157) (0.00416) 
Vacate × Before 0.00684*** -0.00344 
 (0.00202) (0.00453) 
Vacate × After 0.00767*** -0.00495 
 (0.00189) (0.00367) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0315*** 0.0340*** 
 (0.00877) (0.0130) 
Elevation cost × After -0.0189** 0.0545*** 
 (0.00933) (0.0120) 















Considering Subsets of the Full Data Set  
 
Results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 utilized the full data set (N = 1,366). I also considered estimating 
Equation 2 using subsets of the full dataset. Specifically, I estimated Equation two considering 
only respondents (1) with property within 30 miles from the shoreline, (2) with property in East 
and Gulf Coast, (3) who are permanent resident of their community, and (4) who own single-
family houses. These subsets of the data were chosen for a couple of reasons. First, it is possible 
that respondents with properties within 30 miles of the coast and those in the East and Gulf Coast 
states are more prone to flooding from tropical cyclones and thus could perceive the survey as 
more consequential than their counterparts. Also, permanent residents experience flooding in 
person and this may shape their perception on flooding and hence their decision to participate in 
flood risk mitigation. Further, one could hypothesize that single family homeowners are more 
Table 3.7 Continued 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.0174*** 0.00562 
 (0.00310) (0.00474) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00949*** 0.00848 
 (0.00312) (0.00620) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.0207*** 0.0335*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00301) 
Insurance appreciation × After -0.0144*** -0.0296*** 
 (0.00404) (0.00328) 
Buyout × Before -3.762*** 0.322 
 (0.617) (0.209) 
Buyout × After -2.137*** 0.0669 
 (0.530) (0.517) 
Elevation × Before -0.357 1.799*** 
 (0.322) (0.271) 
Elevation × After 0.113 0.746 
 (0.347) (0.863) 
   
Log likelihood  -5146.7058  
Observations (Cluster id) 16,377 (1,366)  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered by the 
respondent. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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likely to participate in flood risk mitigation compared to those with manufactured homes or 
commercial properties. The results, as presented in Table 3.11A in the appendix of the chapter, 
however, shows that overall the main empirical results (with full dataset) are robust to that of the 
subsets of the dataset. That is, they have the same signs but only differ slightly in terms of 
magnitudes and significance.   
 
Considering Interaction Terms 
 
Similarly, I explored further additional sensitivity analysis by interacting respondents’ 
sociodemographic variables with program attributes and alternative specific constants. I present 
results in Table 3.12A through 13.15A. Specifically, I focus on whether the homeowner is white 
or non-white, has a bachelors or post-graduate degree or not, have mortgage or not have flood 
insurance or not, have experienced flood damage or not, have property in 100-year floodplain or 
not, and income class. As expected, some of the results are sensitive to the model specification 
and this somewhat confirms the results obtained from the random parameters logit model. 





For the past few decades, there has been a surge in using buyouts to tackle growing flood 
damages in the U.S, although the program faces participation challenges (Fraser, et al. 2003; 
deVries 2017; Bukvic and Owen 2017). This chapter aims to provide information on the 
attributes of buyout contracts that are of utmost interest to homeowners and use this information 
to construct willingness to accept (WTA) estimates that would guide policy makers in designing 
73 
 
buyout contracts. The choice experiment design used in this chapter to elicit homeowner 
preference for risk mitigation contracts is unique because the attributes differ across alternatives 
while traditional designs have same attributes across alternatives.     
 The analysis reveals important insight concerning homeowner preference for flood risk 
mitigation. Descriptively, most of the homeowners prefer buyouts to home elevation and prefer 
home elevation to the status quo. This is true regardless of whether buyouts are offered prior to a 
flood damage event or after an event. This suggests that under the right contract conditions 
homeowners are likely to accept buyouts. Further investigation into what attributes affect 
preference reveals that homeowners place significant importance on price offered in order to 
accept acquisition contract, which is not surprising. This finding reinforces the importance of 
offering benefits to individuals to engage them in voluntary environmental programs as has been 
shown in the literature. I also find that homeowners have less support for buyout contracts that 
offer the opportunity to rebuild on the same lot after home is torn down. Perhaps one explanation 
to this is that homeowners believe rebuilding to meet current building codes or land restrictions 
will be costly. This is even more so if the restricted land holds less value to the homeowner. 
Another reason could be that homeowners do not believe the restrictions will eliminate the flood 
risk. Another important finding is the emphasis homeowners place on the number of days that 
will elapse between the signing of the contract and when they can expect to be paid. The lesser 
the number of days, the more likely homeowners will accept contract. Relatedly, the greater the 
number of days the homeowner is given to vacate the property the more likely they are to accept 
buyout contract. This is somewhat surprising because houses that are severely damaged during 
flood events are mostly uninhabitable, at least in the short run. Regarding house elevation 
program, as expected, I find that Factors that influence the elevation decision include the cost of 
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elevating the home, the size of elevation subsidies, and future insurance premium rate 
appreciation.           
 In addition to the low buyout participation, officials are concerned about the high cost 
associated with buyouts (Barnhizer, 2003). However, studies show that the benefits of buyouts 
outweigh the cost (Rose et al., 2007; Godschalk et al. 2009; Salvesen, et al. 2018). Rose et al. 
(2007), for example indicate that the average benefit-cost ratio for FEMA floodplain buyout 
grants for the period 1993 and 2003 is 5 to 1. Other analysis of buyouts show that the program 
has accrued avoided losses of several millions of dollars (Salvesen, et al. 2018). Currently the 
federal government funds 75% of the acquisition process while additional funds (25%) are 
sourced from the local government, non-governmental agencies, and the homeowner. Our WTA 
estimates show that the average respondent in our sample is willing to accept a minimum of 
118.5% (minimum of 94.86% if buyout contract is offered post-flood damage event) of the pre-
damage value of their property to relinquish property at its current condition to authorities. That 
is, per Rose, et al. benefit-cost ratio estimate of 5 to 1 (5 to 1 suggests benefits of $375 for every 
$75 spent), presumably, a program that offered 125% of the value of the home (i.e. increasing 
cost to $125), while keeping the same benefits makes a benefit-cost ratio of 3 to 1 (i.e., 
$375/$125), which is still attractive.        
 Between the years 2000 and 2016 the federal government, through FEMA’s HMGP, 
spent $648,421,227 in buyouts of 10, 265 damaged properties (median payout is $50,314; 
average is $ 63,168. per home) (Patterson, 2018). Meanwhile, NFIP policy covers up to 
$250,000 per structure and $100,000 for contents (for single family dwelling) and about 500,000 
for other residential and commercial structures that get damaged by floods. Assuming the 
properties on which it pays claims are repetitive properties, then FEMA could pay claims on the 
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damaged property for years. Buyout contracts are mostly offered post-disaster but based on our 
WTA estimate (118.5% pre-damaged value of property) and the available statistics on the 
benefits of buyouts discussed, we posit that even offering buyouts pre-disaster will accrue larger 
benefits. Salvesen, et al. (2018) finds that local governments could save about $30 per year from 
avoided infrastructure cost such as road maintenance in flood-prone neighborhoods. Other cost 
that could be avoided include emergency and response costs. The National Institute of Building 
Sciences also finds that found that the impact of federal mitigation grants, including grants for 
property acquisition, resulted in an economic impact of $6 for every $1 invested (Multihazard 




This paper presents what is believed to be the first empirical analysis of homeowners’ stated 
preference for household-level flood risk mitigation utilizing discrete choice data from a national 
survey of predominantly coastal homeowners. This study is also the first to jointly investigate 
homeowner stated preference for buyout and home elevation contract attributes. Buyouts and 
home elevation are popular household-level flood risk mitigation strategies FEMA is 
increasingly using to engage homeowners in flood risk mitigation with the goal of bolstering 
NFIP’s solvency. As such, this study sheds light on which attributes of the program are most 
important to homeowners in an area that is of increasing interest to policy makers.   
 Results indicate the obvious, that price offered for buyouts is a key factor that positively 
influences the decision to participate. This finding is consistent with that of findings by 
Frimpong, et al. (2019). Interestingly, the results show that homeowners prefer not to retain the 
right to rebuild on the same lot after accepting a buyout, should such an option be available. This 
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finding is important, especially now that officials are considering allowing homeowners to 
rebuild on the same lot after the current home is torn down. Results further indicate that the 
shorter the payment period and the longer time homeowners can stay in the acquired home 
before vacating, the more likely homeowner will accept a buyout offer. These findings are 
unique in that variations in contract characteristics were not examined in previous buyout 
studies. As expected, the higher the elevation cost, the less likely homeowners are to elevate the 
structure, while increasing elevation subsidies will motivate homeowners to elevate their homes.  
 Another key finding of this study relates to the premium that must be paid to induce 
buyouts before a flood event occurs. Using average compensating variation and bootstrapping to 
test whether there are differences between WTA for undamaged homes and damaged homes are 
statistically significant, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal WTA values. While it is 
unlikely that entire communities will willingly accept buyout offers for their undamaged homes 
without being offered a price premium, this work suggests that offering buyouts on a rolling 
basis and before a storm hits is worth exploring further, especially if offers are coupled with the 
potential for homeowners to stay in their homes for a substantial period before vacating. Overall, 
the analyses suggest that buyout on a rolling basis will accrue larger benefits to federal and local 
governments.
 
CHAPTER 4 : USING SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE RISK INDICATORS IN HAZARD 




This chapter evaluates the policy implications of utilizing subjective versus objective risk 
indicators in hazard risk management tools. To derive a single index each for subjective and 
objective risk, a factor analysis is used. I then integrate these indices with choice experiment 
survey data on households’ preference for household-level flood risk mitigation and estimate 
conditional logit models and willingness to accept to better understand how risk indicator type 
affects policy recommendations. Generally, I find that the model with subjective risk performs 
better, as indicated by the AIC/BIC. More importantly, willingness to accept estimates shows the 
two risk measures yield significantly different policy outcomes, suggesting that the type of risk 




Through managing climate risk, researchers have developed frameworks for conceptualizing 
natural hazard resilience of different social systems - household, community, and national. A 
core component of these resilience frameworks is the hazard risk indicator (Cutter 2008). Hazard 
risk indicators fall under two broad categories-- subjective and objective risk indicators. In this 
context, “subjective” refers to a measure based on personal judgment while “objective” refers to 
a measure based on external judgment and verification (Maxwell et al. 2015).  
 
23 With Gregory Howard and Jamie Kruse. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under 
collaborative awards #1433622 and #1856256. The statements, findings, and conclusions are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
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 Typically, objective risk indicators have been considered in resilience frameworks (Jones, 
Samman, and Vinck 2018; Frimpong, et al. 2019 and 2020). Some have argued that objective 
risk does not always perform satisfactorily in measuring resilience (Jones, Samman, and Vinck 
2018), but there is little evidence to support the argument. Like Jones, Samman and Vinck 
(2018), other studies have considered subjective risk indicators in measuring resilience (Baker, et 
al. 2009; Jones and Tanner 2017). Still others have integrated both subjective and objective risk 
indicators in resilience frameworks (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013; Petrolia, et al. 2015), 
although incorporating multiple risk indicators in resilience frameworks, especially in 
econometric models, may yield misleading results due to potential correlation between hazard 
risk indicators. Perhaps because of this lack of consensus regarding which type of risk indicator 
should be included in resilience frameworks, there remains a gray understanding of the 
implications of utilizing one risk category over another.      
 This chapter contributes to the hazard mitigation literature by evaluating whether and to 
what extent the choice of risk indicator (i.e., subjective and objective) has differential 
implications on hazard policy recommendations. That is, this chapter both advances the 
operationalization of natural hazard resilience measures and provides effective approaches to 
managing the impacts of climate change.        
 Given the longstanding limitations to incorporating multiple risk indicators in 
econometric models, I employ a factor analysis to create an index for subjective and objective 
risk categories. Each risk index category is built using several intercorrelated within-category 
risk indicators. I then interact these indices with attributes and alternative specific constants for 
buyouts and home elevation contracts and estimate conditional logit regression models. The 
resultant preference parameters are used to calculate minimum willingness to accept (WTA) for 
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a buyout and home elevation contract, which can be used to evaluate the policy implications of 
using subjective or objective risk indicators.        
 The results indicate that the model with subjective risk is preferred, as indicated by the 
AIC/BIC. These are information theoretic measures, indicating that there is more relevant 
information related to homeowner preferences for risk mitigation embedded in subjective risk 
measures than in their objective risk counterparts, at least in the context of this study. More 
importantly, willingness to accept estimates shows the two risk measures yield significantly 
different policy consequences, suggesting that the type of risk indicator (subjective and 
objective) used in empirical work has important implications.    
 The remainder of this chapter is organized in three sections. The first section describes 
the data, presents an overview of factor analysis, and outlines how it is applied in this chapter to 
generate the subjective and objective risk indices. This section also describes the empirical 
model used to measure resilience and the framework used to compute minimum willingness to 
accept estimates. The second section presents and discusses the results from the estimated 






Three separate categories of data are used in this paper: (1) risk measures used to construct the 
subjective risk index, (2) risk measures used to construct the objective risk index, and (3) stated 
preference choice experiment data. I provide an overview of the process to construct the 
subjective and objective risk index and refer readers to chapter three for the detailed description 
of the stated choice experiment data. In this chapter, however, I use a subset of the full stated 
80 
 
choice experiment dataset. Specifically, I only consider respondents with valid property address 
information. As a robustness check, I also consider only East and Gulf Coast samples and 
present results in the appendix of the chapter.        
 I begin with the description of elements used in the subjective and objective risk indices, 
and then provide an overview of constructing the indices themselves. First, the subjective risk 
index comprises respondents’ (1) structure damage experience, (2) extent of structure damage, 
(3) expected structure damage from next flood, (4) chance of future flooding, and (5) flood 
insurance. We measure these variables via an online survey we administer to predominantly 
coastal residential homeowners (IRB # UMCIRB 18-000714). Presented in figure 4.1 are the 
survey text for questions used to capture subjective risk perception. The wording of the questions 
is consistent with what has been used in the literature on hazard mitigation (Petrolia, Landry, and 
Coble 2013). Structure damage experience and flood insurance elements are binary and were 
assigned the value one (1) if the respondent has experienced flood damage to the structure and 
has flood insurance, respectively, and the value zero (0) otherwise. We scaled extent of structure 
damage and expected structure damage as the midpoint for each interval.24 So, for example, 20-
39% is scaled to 29.5%, 40-59% is scaled as 49.5% and so forth. Chance of future flooding is 
scaled as lower bound estimate, so if respondent expects the next flood within the next five years 
of less, we scale it as 0.2 (i.e., 1/5) 0.1 if within the next 10 years, and so forth. 
 Geospatial flood hazard data from several sources are used to generate measures of 
objective flood risk. Specifically, we consider the following elements: (1) flood depth (storm 
surge inundation), (2) floodplain, and (3) distance. Flood depth is measured in feet and the data, 
which is in a raster format (flood depth maps), is obtained from the National Weather Service’s 
 
24 We also considered re-scaling it as ordinal (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, where 1 is less than 20%, 2 is 20-39%, …, and 5 
is 80-100%) and outcomes are similar. 
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(NWS) National Hurricane Center (NHC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) (NOAA 2019). NHC utilizes the hydrodynamic Sea, Lake, and 
Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) model to simulate storm surge in 27 basins along the 
U.S East and Gulf Coasts to generate inundation data (Jelesnianski, et al. 1992 and Zachry, et al. 
2015). The SLOSH model predicts flood depth for 5 hurricane categories (i.e., categories 1, 2, 3, 
4, and 5) based on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale. Because residents may face 
different storm surge risks and these risks could be progressive (i.e., a resident facing cat 1 storm 
surge could potentially face cat 2, 3, 4, and 5 storm) we consider all 5 hurricane categories.25 We 
note, however, that for levee areas, storm surge data are not reported and so properties in this 
area are excluded from the analysis.26 The SLOSH model has over the years been used to create 
evacuation zones and to evaluate societal impacts from storm surge flooding (Zachry et al. 
2015), hence is an appropriate indicator for objective flood risk. For the floodplain element, we 
use the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) 
(FEMA 2019c). For flood insurance purposes, FEMA categorizes flood zones into two broad 
categories -- special flood hazard area (SFHA) and non-special flood hazard area (non-SFHA). 
The SFHA, also referred to as “100-year floodplain” or high risk, is the land area covered by the 
floodwaters of the “base flood” on flood insurance rate maps (FIRMs) (Frimpong, et al., 2020).27 
SFHA comprises broadly two flood zones. Land area in A and V zones are subject to inundation 
 
25 Residents in north east of east coast of U.S. may face only up to category 4 hurricane. This is because coastal 
waters in this region are relatively cold and thus will inhibit a category 5 hurricane which requires a much warmer 
water. 
26 A total of 11 properties in our sample were in levee areas and were excluded from the analysis.  
27 “The “base flood” is the flood having a 1% chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. This is the 
regulatory standard, also referred to as the “100-year flood”, and the SFHA is thus also referred to as the “100-year 
flood zone”. The base flood is the national standard used by the NFIP and all federal agencies for the purposes of 
requiring the purchase of flood insurance and regulating new development. Base Flood Elevation (BFE), which is 
the computed elevation to which floodwater is anticipated to rise during the base flood, is typically shown on 
FIRMs.” (Frimpong, et al. 2020). 
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by the 1-percent-annual-chance flood event. The difference is that V zones are also subject to 
coastal storm induced waves. That is, houses in V zones are expected to suffer greater losses 
from wave action compared to those in A zones. On the other hand, non-SFHA comprises the B / 
X flood zone (moderate risk): an area within the 0.2-percent-annual-chance floodplain; C/ X 
flood zone (risk is minimal): an area outside the 1-percent and 0.2-percent-annual-chance 
floodplains; and D (undetermined risk): the area is unstudied although flooding is possible. 
About 25% of all flood claims filed are for structures located within these non-SFHA zones 
(Floodpartners 2020). In this paper, we follow FEMA in categorizing flood zone into two: SFHA 
and non-SFHA and assign the value one (1) if a property is in a SFHA and zero (0) otherwise for 
our variable floodplain. Lastly, for the variable distance, I calculate the distance, in miles, from 
the respondent’s property to the coastline as the shortest distance between respondent’s property 
and the coastline. The coastline data is a polyline and is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
Department of Commence (Data.Gov 2019). Because data on the three objective risk indicators 
are georeferenced, I am able to overlay with the homeowner’s property address information I 
collected from the online survey to ensure that objective risk data are at the property-level.28 By 
doing so, I eliminate potential bias when comparing subjective and objective risk. The data 
extractions and calculations are performed in ArcGIS desktop. Table 4.1 presents the summary 










Figure 4.1: Survey questions used to capture subjective risk  
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Variables Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
 Subjective risk 
Structure damage 
experience 
=1 if home is ever damaged, 0 
otherwise 
0.305 0.461 0 1 
Extent of structure 
damage 
Value of current home damage 
expressed as a %  
11.079 20.366 0 90 
Expected structure 
damage from next 
flood 
Value of expected home damage 
expressed as a % 
12.164 22.267 0 90 
Chance of future 
flooding 
Subjective Probability of future 
flood 
0.096 0.087 0 0.2 
      
Flood insurance =1 if home has flood insurance, 0 
otherwise 
0.477 0.4995 0 1 
      
 Objective risk 
Cat 1 Depth of storm surge resulting 
from category 1 tropical cyclone. 
Measured in feet. 
0.202 0.961 0 10 
Cat 2 Depth of storm surge resulting 
from category 2 tropical cyclone. 
Measured in feet. 
0.716 2.136 0 15 
Cat 3 Depth of storm surge resulting 
from category 3 tropical cyclone. 
Measured in feet. 
1.614 3.678 0 21 
Cat 4 Depth of storm surge resulting 
from category 4 tropical cyclone. 
Measured in feet. 
2.867 5.424 0 21 
Cat 5 Depth of storm surge resulting 
from category 5 tropical cyclone. 
Measured in feet. 
2.912 6.056 0 21 
Floodplain =1 if home is in a 100-year 
floodplain, 0 otherwise 
0.167 0.373 0 1 
Distance Linear distance from home to 
nearest coastline 
58.438 88.588 0.031 476.041 
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Next, I employ exploratory factor analysis to create indices for subjective and objective risk.29 
Factor analysis is a data shrinking statistical technique that identifies a latent factor or factors 
that underlie a set of observed variables.30 The technique has been used by researchers in both 
the social and natural sciences (Kim and Mueller 1978; Subbarao, Subbarao, Chandu 1996) to 
derive a set of uncorrelated variables for further analysis. Factor analysis assumes that there are a 
small number of common latent factors responsible for the covariation among a group of 
observed variables (Kim, et al. 1978; Kim and Mueller 1978). Those factors that are unique are 
assumed to be orthogonal to each other and thus do not contribute to the covariation between 
observed variables (Harman 1976; Kim and Mueller 1978). Equation 1 describes the factor 
analysis process. The goal is to find a few common factors that linearly reconstruct a set of 
observed variables which in our case are the elements for the respective risk categories: 
         
, 1
n




= +                 (4.1) 
where ijy  is the value of the ith observation on the jth element, irl  is the ith observation on the rth 
common factor, r j  is the set of linear coefficients called factor loadings, and ije  is the jth 
variable’s unique factor (similar to a residual). The initial number of factors is equivalent to the 
number of elements used in the analysis. Factor loadings show the correlation between the 
 
29 There are two types of factor analysis - exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. Exploratory 
factor analysis examines the number of factors or how many dimensions are in a set of variables whiles 
confirmatory factor analysis seeks to test specific hypothesis about the structure or the number of dimensions 
underlying a set of variables (e.g., the number of latent factors, factor loadings, factor correlations, and factor 
means) (Harman 1976). 
30 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Factor analysis are parallel. Both aim at reducing the dimensionality of 
a data set (i.e., variable reduction technique). However, they require different approaches to arrive at data reduction. 
For factor analysis, the objective is to identify certain unobserved factors from the observed variables, whereas PCA 




elements and the factors. All except ijy is to be estimated (Stata 13). There are an infinite number 
of solutions to Equation 1. Principal axis factor, maximum likelihood, generalized least squares, 
and unweighted least squares are examples of approaches that could be used to fit the data and 
extract the factors (Harman 1976). After the extraction of the factors, various constraints are 
introduced to make the model determinate (Stata 13). That is, the loadings could be rotated, and 
the rotations are in two forms: orthogonal and oblique. Orthogonal rotation assumes the factors 
are uncorrelated whiles oblique rotation assumes intercorrelated factors. Although oblique 
rotations are often desired, they fall short of retaining some important properties of the original 
solution (Stata 13). The rotation is, however, irrelevant when only one factor in a solution is 
desired (Grace-Martin 2020). The factor selection process has the effect of maximizing the 
correlation between data and the projection and is equivalent to carrying out multiple linear 
regression on the projected data against each variable of the original data. The first factor (Factor 
1) represents the strongest correlation between variables and the latent factor.  
 As recommended, I begin to create our indices by examining the correlations of the 
elements (variables) to identify and potentially eliminate variables that correlate at less than 0.4 
with all other variables within each risk category (Kim and Meuller 1978; Hinkin 1998), or 
variables with insignificant correlation coefficients. Presented in Table 4.2 are the correlation 
coefficients between elements under the risk categories. Except for distance in the objective risk 
category all other variables within each risk category fall on or exceeds the correlation 
coefficient benchmark (i.e., 0.4). I, however, keep distance because it significantly correlates 





Table 4.2: Correlation coefficients for subjective and objective risk variables 




































0.383 0.302 0.306 1    
Insurance 0.359 0.353 0.349 0.310 1   
 
 Objective risk 
 Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5 Floodplain Distance 
Cat 1 1       
Cat 2 0.870 1      
Cat 3 0.725 0.924 1     
Cat 4 0.600 0.822 0.947 1    
Cat 5 0.441 0.609 0.695 0.788 1   
Floodplain 0.455 0.607 0.595 0.556 0.439 1  
Distance -0.129 -0.191 -0.242 -0.289 -0.252 -0.160 1 
Note: All coefficients are significant at 1% significant level 
 
I then perform the factor analysis using the factor procedure in Stata 13.1. Because I am 
interested in creating only one variable (i.e., the index) for each risk category, I retain only one 
factor, Factor 1. Factor 1 has the highest eigenvalue, 2.9 and 4.3, and explains 100% and 90% of 
the total variance for subjective and objective risk, respectively. Table 4.3 presents the factor 
loadings, eigenvalues, and percent of total variability. I show output for Factor 1 and Factor 2 
although I keep only Factor 1 for further analysis. I then generate factor scores, which are 
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estimates of Factor 1, for each observation in the dataset. Factor scores serve as our index for 
each type of risk. Finally, I normalize the scores to have mean zero and standard deviation 1 by 
taking the difference between the factor scores and its mean, and then divide by the standard 
deviation.  
Table 4.3: Eigenvalues and factor loadings 
Variables Subjective risk  Objective risk 
 Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 1 Factor 2 
Structure damage experience 0.878 0.043    
Extent of structure damage 0.924 -0.158    
Expected structure damage 
from next flood 
0.926 -0.141    
Chance of future flooding 0.385 0.326    
Insurance 0.435 0.260    
      
Cat 1    0.776 0.444 
Cat 2    0.953 0.260 
Cat 3    0.975 -0.043 
Cat 4    0.937 -0.290 
Cat 5    0.730 -0.333 
Floodplain    0.607 0.013 
Distance    -0.249 0.172 
      
Eigenvalue 2.819 0.220  4.300 0.491 
      
Percent of total variability 
accounted for by each factor 
101.2 8  89.6 10.2 
Note: Subjective risk: LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10) = 5.9e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.000; 






To examine the policy implications of the choice of risk indicator, I first estimate two conditional 
logit models. The first model includes the interaction of the subjective risk index with the 
89 
 
attributes and alternative specific constants (ASC) for buyout and home elevation, while the 
second model includes the interaction of objective risk index with the attributes and alternative 
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    (4.2) 
where Uij is utility and Xijk is a vector of attributes. k ,  , , k ,  , and   are parameters to be 
estimated. I replace R with subjective risk index when estimating Equation 2 with subjective risk 
index interactions and replace R with objective risk index when estimating Equation 2 with 
objective risk index interactions. Given this model structure, k estimates preferences for 
program attributes for an individual with the average level of risk in the sample (R=0), while k
estimates the change in preferences for program attributes as the level of risk faced by the 
individual increases. 
 
Estimating Minimum Willingness to Accept 
 
Next, I use information from the estimated parameters in Equation 4.2 to estimate the minimum 
willingness to accept (WTA) for a buyout and home elevation contract for the average 
homeowner in our sample using Hanemann’s (1984) average compensating variation framework. 
WTA (and willingness to pay – WTP) measures are often used to inform policy analyses 
(Loomis 2014). For contract type (buyout vs elevation), I generate and compare two WTA 
estimates: one for average level of subjective risk and one for the average level of objective risk. 
Both buyout contracts require the homeowner to sell both house and lot, pay the homeowner in 
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300 days, and require the homeowner to vacate the property after 60 days. Home elevation 
contracts would cost 30% of the property’s value to elevate home. In all cases, the respondent 
has an alternative of choosing the status quo option, which carries with it an insurance premium 
rate increase of 50%. Choosing the elevation contract also leads to a premium increase of 50%. 







= − −        (4.3) 
where 1V  is the estimated utility of the contract, 0V  is the estimated utility of the status-quo 
option, and price  is the coefficient associated with the buyout transaction price. For elevation 
contract I replace price  with subsidy , the subsidy for elevation.  
 
Results and Discussion  
 
Results from Conditional logit model Estimation 
 
Presented in Table 4.4 are the results of the estimated conditional logit models for subjective risk 
and objective risk. As a robustness check, I also estimated the models with risk index computed 
using the principal component analysis and present results in the appendix. Generally, results are 
similar to what I discuss in this section. I discuss the results from the two models concurrently. 
On comparing the model statistics, that is, pseudo r-squared and AIC and BIC, I note that the 
model with subjective risk performs better compared to the objective risk model. A finding that 
somewhat confirms the Jones, Samman, and Vinck (2018) argument for the preference of 
subjective risk as a measure of resilience. Generally, considering the average respondent in the 
sample, except for insurance appreciation and the alternative-specific constant for the elevation 
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option, coefficients in the two models have the same sign and significance, with closely parallel 
magnitudes. For example, I note that for both models, the average respondent prefers more 
money in order to accept buyout contracts, assigns no premium to being able to retain the deed 
restricted lot, and values contracts that pay shortly after accepting contract and allow a longer 
stay or use of the property by the owner. The results, however, differ greatly, both in magnitude 
and statistical significance, if I factor in risk. For example, I find that increasing subjective risk 
by one standard deviation decreases sensitivity to buyout premia significantly while the same 
one standard deviation increases in objective risk results in no change in sensitivity to buyout 
premium.           
 Further, I find that for the two models, respondents’ preference for elevation contract 
characteristics are very similar at the average level of risk, whether it be objective or subjective. 
The estimates from the two models differ significantly, as I increase risk in the two models. That 
is, compared to the objective risk counterpart, respondents with above average subjective risk 
(i.e., 1 standard deviation increase in subjective risk index) become less sensitive to the cost of 
elevation as well as the offered elevation subsidy. Lastly, all other contract characteristics held 
constant, I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in subjective risk index leads to a dramatic 
increase in preference for both the elevation and buyout contracts relative to the status-quo 
option (as shown by buyout and elevation alternative-specific constants), but I find no similar 








Table 4.4: Results from the conditional logit model estimations  
Variables R = Subjective risk   R= Objective risk 
Price 0.016***  0.017*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Price × R -0.005***  -0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Sell both house and lot  0.186***  0.188 *** 
 (0.064)  (0.064) 
Sell both house and lot × R -0.023  0.058 
 (0.070)  (0.059) 
Acquisition pay period  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Acquisition pay period × R 0.002*  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Vacate  0.002**  0.002** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Vacate × R -0.00003  -0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Elevation cost  -0.007**  -0.008** 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Elevation cost × R 0.006*  0.004 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Elevation subsidy  0.010***  0.010*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Elevation subsidy × R -0.004***  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Insurance appreciation  -0.004**  -0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Insurance appreciation × R -0.002  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Buyout  -1.116***  -1.179*** 
 (0.273)  (0.271) 
Buyout × R 0.764***  0.061 
 (0.290)  (0.282) 
Elevation  -0.281  -0.229 
 (0.172)  (0.167) 
Elevation × R 0.869***  -0.146 
 (0.164)  (0.153)     
Pseudo R-squared 0.127  0.094 
Log pseudolikelihood -4044.208  -4198.869 
AIC / BIC 8124.416 / 8258.43  8433.739 / 8567.753 
Observations (Cluster id) 12,648 (949)   12,648 (949) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Policy Implications: Minimum Willingness to Accept 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, WTP/WTA measures are often used to inform policy 
analyses (Loomis 2014). In this paper, I am interested in estimating both WTA for a contract, but 
also in understanding what changes in the homeowner’s risk index would induce a specified 
reduction in WTA. Presented in Table 4.5 are the WTA estimates for a specified contract for a 
homeowner with the average level of risk according to each index (subjective vs. objective).  
Table 4.5: Results from the estimated compensating variation framework 
 Subjective risk Objective risk 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
interval 
     
  Buyout   
Mean risk 98.56%*** 72.10, 125.03 106.93%*** 81.71, 132.14 
 (13.50)  (12.87)  
     
 Std dev. for subjective risk Index Std dev. for objective risk index 
Induce 10% reduction 0.16* -0.003, 0.32 1.48 -1.85, 4.81 
 (0.08)  (1.70)  
Induce 20% reduction 0.29** 0.003, 0.58 2.8 -1.42, 7.02 
 (0.15)  (2.15)  
     
  Elevation   
Mean risk  47.9%*** 22.65, 73.15 51.69%*** 25.11, 78.28 
 (12.88)  (13.56)  
     
 Std dev. for subjective risk index Std dev. for objective risk index 
Induce 10% reduction 0.05** 0.01, 0.09 3.08 -1.43, 7.59 
 (0.21)  (2.30)  
Induce 20% reduction 0.1** 0.02, 0.18 8.61** 2.61, 14.61 
 (0.04)  (3.06)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Buyout contract comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell both house and lot (1); 
Acquisition pay period (300 days); Vacate (60 days). Home elevation contract: Elevation cost 




For buyout contracts, the minimum WTA are 98.6% fair market value of the home for a 
homeowner with the average level of subjective risk and 106.9% fair market value of the home 
for a homeowner with the average level of objective risk. Further, to induce a 10 % (20%) 
reduction in the WTA, standard deviation estimates show that homeowner’s subjective risk index 
will have to be increased by 0.16 (0.29) standard deviations while objective risk index will 
require a much larger increase of 1.5 (2.8) standard deviations.     
 For elevation contracts, the minimum WTA are 47.9% of the cost of elevation for a 
homeowner with the average level of subjective risk and 51.7% of the cost of elevation for a 
homeowner with the average level of objective risk. To induce a 10% (20%) reduction in the 
WTA, the homeowner’s subjective risk index will have to be increased by 0.05(0.1) standard 
deviations while the objective risk index will have to increase by 3.08 (8.6) standard deviations. 
It is worth mentioning that although standard deviation estimates for the objective risk index are 
not significant (except for elevation contract when I want to induce a 20% reduction in WTA), it 
provides a fair understanding of how different, especially in magnitude, it is from that of the 
subjective risk index. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
A recent assessment (Jones, Samman, and Vinck 2018) of using subjective or objective risk to 
measure resilience indicates the two risk categories yield different outcomes, as expected. 
However, until now, the policy implications of using subjective or objective risk as a hazard risk 
management tool was lacking in the literature. This paper investigated the policy implications of 
using subjective or objective risk as hazard risk management tool to measure household flood 
risk mitigation decisions. This paper also demonstrates the use of factor analysis to create indices 
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for intercorrelated hazard indicator variables for further analysis.      
 The first discovery to emerge from this paper is that the model with subjective risk 
measure holds more information related to homeowner preferences for risk mitigation than 
objective risk counterparts. Jones, Samman, and Vinck (2018) also notes that subjective risk 
measures perform satisfactorily in measuring resilience. Based on willingness to accept 
estimates, I find that the two risk measures yield significantly different policy outcomes. This 
implies that officials are not any more likely to get homeowners to accept buyout contracts if 
they target higher risk homes based on objective risk. On the other hand, given that the factor 
analysis indicates that expected structure damage from next flood, extent of structure damage, 
and structure damage experience strongly define subjective risk index, if officials can target 
repetitive loss homes, the chances of increased uptake are considerable. That is, overall, findings 
from this study suggest that researchers and hazard risk managers need to carefully consider the 
choice of risk indicators used to inform hazard mitigation policies.      
 I have explored the policy implications of using subjective versus objective risk 
indicators to inform hazard mitigation policy with application to flood risk hazard and studying 
households. The main limitation to this work is the limited objective flood hazard data. The 
analyses do not account for other objective flood risk data such as precipitation. Future work 
should consider precipitation and other objective flood risk data at the parcel-level. The methods 
applied in this chapter could be extended to other risk hazards and social systems. Again, over 
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APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 2.10A: Coefficient estimates for all models 









Before hurricane  -2.16*** - - - - - 
Floodplain -0.62** -0.63** -0.61** -0.61** - -0.62** 
log (Distance) -0.21** -0.13** -0.11* -0.13* -0.13** -0.13** 
log (Lot size) -0.20** -0.21** -.021** -0.21** -0.21*** -0.20** 
Tenure in home -0.01* -0.01* - -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
Race  0.43** -  0.48**  0.44**  0.43*  0.44** 
Income       
  Lower -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 - 
  Higher -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 - 
Education  0.28  0.28  0.30 -  0.29  
Constant -3.66*** -2.59*** -4.36*** -4.47*** -3.64*** -3.60*** 
Before hurricane × price  0.06*** - - - - - 
After hurricane × price  0.04*** - - - - - 
Before Hurricane × Z - -3.04*** -1.30* -1.88** -2.52** -1.32 
After hurricane × Z - -0.90  0.65  1.21 -0.91 -0.74 
Before Hurricane × Z × price -  0.06***  0.05***  0.06***  0.05***  0.05*** 
After hurricane × Z × price -  0.04***  0.04***  0.40***  0.05***  0.05*** 
       
Pseudo R2  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.30  0.29  0.29 
Note: ***, **, and * shows significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance. Standard 
errors are robust clustered for 172 clusters in identifier (id), and number of observations=1519. 
Each column represents a model, with the first column representing the base model described by 
Equation (2a) and the remaining columns representing models described by Equation (2b). Each 
of these models accounts for heterogeneity for a single covariate, denoted Z. These models omit 
the “Before Hurricane” variable as well as the covariate, and include two- and three-way 
















Table 2.11A: Interval regression results 
 















































































































Differences  1/6* 
(3 others 
p < 0.1) 
4/6 2/6* 
(3 others p < 
0.1) 
5/6 
Notes: ***, **, and * show significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance. Standard 
errors are robust clustered for 172 clusters in identifier (id). Each column represents a model, 
with the first column representing the interval regression that mirrors the base model described 
using Equation 2.2a (with price variables omitted) and the remaining columns representing 
models described by Equation 2.2b (also with price variables omitted). Each of these models 
accounts for heterogeneity for a single covariate, denoted as Z. These models include two-way 
interactions of the covariate in question with the timing dummies (Before and After hurricane). 
The models described by Equation 2.2b generate four groups, which allows for six distinct 
binary comparisons between groups. The bottom row of the table shows how many of these six 
comparisons reject the null hypothesis of no difference between groups at the 5% level of 




APPENDIX B: APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Random Utility Theory 
 
 The random utility theory (RUT) is a well-known theory for modeling discrete choices 
of individuals (McFadden 1974 and Hanemann 1984). The theory assumes that individuals’ 
utility for a good is a function of observable (deterministic/ systemic) and unobservable 
(stochastic/random) components (Manski 1973). The former is comprised the attributes of the 
good/service (Griliches 1961 and Lancaster 1966) while the latter, according to Manski (1973), 
arise due to omitted attributes, imperfect information, and the use of proxies (instrumental 
variables) which contain random errors. Since the researcher has incomplete behavioral 
information about the decision-maker, the researcher can only assume a probabilistic behavior of 
the decision-maker (Lancaster 1966).  
Assume individual i’s utility (U) for flood mitigation activity (j) is a function of the 
deterministic component (Vij) of the utility (U) and a stochastic component . We further assume 
the homeowner is rational and maximizes utility by choosing the mitigation program that gives 
the highest comparable utility subject to homeowner’s budget constraint. Mathematically, we can 
express the homeowner’s utility function as 
                       ij ij ijU V = +                          (3A1) 
We further decompose the deterministic component to be a function of the attributes (X) of flood 
mitigation j and the homeowner’ characteristics (W). That is ij j iV X W= + . Substituting into 
Equation A1, we have ij ij i ijU X W = + + . For simplicity, let us assume there are two competing 
flood mitigation options: j and k, J . Since we don’t have complete behavioral information 
about the homeowner we can only make probabilistic judgments: 1 if homeowner prefers j and 0 
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otherwise. Thus, we can only compare utilities and assume homeowner i will choose flood 
mitigation j if the expected utility for j is greater than the expected utility for k, that is, 
i j ikEU EU . 
This can further be expressed mathematically as, 
( ) ( )
( )
Pr 1 , , Pr
Pr 0 , ,
Pr 0 , ,
ij ij ik i ij ik
ij i ij ik i ik ij ik i
ij ik ij ik ij ik i
Y X X W U U
X W X W X X W
X X X X W
 
 
   = =   
 = + + − + + 
 
 = − + − 
 
    (3A2) 
where njP is the probability (Pr) that the difference in the observed utilities of the chosen 
alternative (j) and the other alternatives (k) is greater than the difference between the unobserved 
variation in the utility of the other alternatives (k) and the utility of the chosen alternative (j).  
 We note that the decision-maker’s specific characteristics (W) falls out of Equation A2. This is 
because it is invariant across the two goods and is assumed to be captured by the random 
component. 
Several standard choice models and their econometric applications have been developed 
based on the specification of the distributions for the random component (McFadden 1974 and 
Hanemann 1984) and applied in recent studies. These discrete choice models include 
multinomial logit, conditional logit, random parameter logit, and latent class models (Bhat 1997; 
Birol, Karousakis, and Koundouri 2002; Columbo, Hanley, and Louviere 2009; Train 1998 and 
2009; McFadden and Train 2000; McFadden 1973; Hanemann 1984).  
From Equation 3A1, we can introduce coefficients for the attribute variables and decision 
maker specific characteristics as, 
                               ij ij iV X W= +                      (3A3) 
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Where   and   are vector of parameters to be estimated for the observable attributes X and 
decision-maker characteristics, W. Assuming the random component of the utility follows a 
Gumbel or a Type 1 extreme value distribution,  
                           ( ) ( )( )exp expij ijF  = − −               (3A4) 
then the probability the decision-maker i will choose alternative j, the best alternative, from a set 
of policy alternatives J can be specified as a function of the systematic component (V). That is, 



















               (3A5) 
 
 
Conditional Logit Model 
 
The conditional logit model allows one to compare the utility of one alternative to the 
other (Greene 2012), and as such serve as the basis for modeling the random utility model. This 
model, customarily, does not allow for data on decision-maker characteristics (Greene 2012). 
From Equation 3A5, under the conditional logit model, the choice probability for the decision-
maker can be expressed as, 


















                      (3A6) 
To estimate the vector of preference (attributes) parameters ( ) , a log-likelihood (In L) function 
is used. 








= = Pr                      (3A7) 
The conditional logit model, however, assumes preference homogeneity (Colombo, Hanley, 
Louviere 2009; Howard, Roe, and Martin 2018). That is, the population share a single-parameter 
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estimate for each estimable choice attribute (Colombo, Hanley, Louviere 2009; Howard, Roe, 
and Martin 2018) which can be unrealistic. Researchers have tried to adjust the conditional 
model to account for heterogeneity by interacting decision-maker specific characteristics with 
choice attributes or with an alternative-specific constant31 (Greene 2012; Colombo, Hanley, 
Louviere 2009) To formally account for heterogeneityone could use the random parameter or 
mixed logit model (Train 1998; McFadden and Train 2000). 
 
Random Parameter (Mixed) Logit Model 
 
The random parameter logit model is, perhaps, the most popular discrete choice model 
used by researchers (Train 1998; McFadden and Train 2000). This model shares some similarity 
with the latent class model in that, they both account for heterogeneity in decision-makers 
preference. However, the latent class model assumes a discrete preference heterogeneity while 
the random parameter model assumes continuous preference heterogeneity (Howard, Roe, and 
Martin 2018). The choice probability for a random parameter logit model is expressed as,  


















,                   (3A8) 
We note that in Equation A8, a subscript i is introduced for the parameter vector ( )i . This 
indicate preference heterogeneity under the mixed logit model. That is, the model assumes that 
parameters are continuously distributed over decision-makers, with  
                   i i iW = + +                               (3A9) 
where W is a vector of decision-maker specific characteristics as defined earlier and affects the 
mean of the random parameter distribution (Greene and Hensher 2003).  and  are vector of 
 
31 Alternative specific constants are dummy variables created for the alternative choices (Greene 2012) 
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coefficients and   is a random effect or component assumed to have a mean of zero and a 
constant variance (Greene and Hensher 2003). The variance of the distribution of the parameter 
vector ( )i is given as   =  . The choice probability for the decision-maker is expressed 
as,  





























               (3A10) 
The parameters in Equation 3A10 are estimated by maximizing the simulated log likelihood 
function which is expressed as,  
         ( ) ( )PrIn =
i
msl i iY j dL f= 




















Table 3.8A: SAS macro results on design 
 
Final Results 
Design  21 
Number of choice sets 30 
Alternatives 2 
Parameters  11 
Maximum parameters 30 
D-Efficiency 20.0995 
Relative D-Efficiency 66.9982 
D-Error 0.0498 
Note: First, we use the %mktruns macro to determine how big a candidate sets we need. The 
%mktex macro was then used to make candidate set of alternatives (Kuhfeld 2010). Further, the 
%mktroll is used to convert the linear arrangement created with the %mktex into a choice design 
(Kuhfeld 2010). We proceed to use the %choiceEff macro to create and evaluate the choice 
design (Kuhfeld 2010). In all we specify the program to create 30 choice sets with two 
alternatives excluding the status-squo. Our final design32 was selected to maximize relative D-
efficiencyi33 (Kuhfeld 2010). Unlike other efficiency measures (e.g., A-efficiency, G-efficiency) 
the D-efficiency is the most used (Kuhfeld 2010). Relative D-efficiency ranges from 0 to 100 % 
where values approaching 100% or equal to 100% is preferred and indicates the degree of 
efficiency (Kuhfeld 2010). In practice, most designs are not exactly optimal (100%) (Kuhfeld 
2010). Presented in Table 2 are results from the design. Our design shows a relative D-efficiency 
of 67%. We use %mktdups macro to identify any duplicate choice set (we found no duplicate 
sets). Following standard practice (Kuhfeld 2010), we group the 30 choice sets into 15 blocks, 























32 An efficient design has a small variance matrix (Kuhfeld 2010). 
33 Relative D efficiency is the ratio of two D-efficiencies for two competing designs. It can be computed as D-




Table 3.9A: Conditional logit regression results showing all three alternative specific constants 
 
Variables Model 1:Base model Model 2 Model 3 
Price × Before 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) 
Price × After 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00211) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.189** 0.189** 0.189** 
 (0.0768) (0.0768) (0.0768) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0756) (0.0756) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00327*** -0.00327*** -0.00327*** 
 (0.000966) (0.000966) (0.000966) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00305*** -0.00305*** -0.00305*** 
 (0.000940) (0.000940) (0.000940) 
Vacate × Before 0.00355*** 0.00355*** 0.00355*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) 
Vacate × After 0.00388*** 0.00388*** 0.00388*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00110) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** 
 (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00413) 
Elevation cost × After -0.00187 -0.00187 -0.00187 
 (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00408) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00180) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00607*** 0.00607*** 0.00607*** 
 (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00232 -0.00232 -0.00232 
 (0.00199) (0.00199) (0.00199) 
Insurance appreciation × After -8.14e-05 -8.14e-05 -8.14e-05 
 (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00204) 
Buyout × Before -1.444*** -1.415***  
 (0.309) (0.320)  
Buyout × After -0.420 -0.493  
 (0.303) (0.309)  
Elevation × Before -0.0286  1.415*** 
 (0.180)  (0.320) 
Elevation × After 0.0738  0.493 
 (0.179)  (0.309) 
Statusquo × Before  0.0286 1.444*** 
  (0.180) (0.309) 
Statusquo × After  -0.0738 0.420 
  (0.179) (0.303) 
    
Pseudo R-Square 0.085 0.085 0.085 
Log pseudolikelihood -5487.2596 -5487.2596 -5487.2596 
Observations (Cluster id) 16,377 (1,366) 16,377 (1,366) 16,377 (1,366) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Sell both house and lot 0.207*** 
 (0.0555) 




Elevation cost -0.00825*** 
 (0.00294) 
Elevation subsidy 0.00837*** 
 (0.00128) 








Pseudo R-square 0.0834 
Log pseudolikelihood -5497.3355 
Observations (cluster id) 16,377 (1,366) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 


























Table 3.11A: Conditional logit regression results comparing all sample with subsamples  
 
Variables All sample 30 miles from 
shoreline  






Price × Before 0.0179*** 0.0157*** 0.0184*** 0.0201*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00273) (0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00250) 
Price × After 0.0113*** 0.0112*** 0.0118*** 0.0115*** 0.0101*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00258) (0.00225) (0.00224) (0.00237) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.189** 0.179** 0.236*** 0.207** 0.208** 
 (0.0768) (0.0914) (0.0816) (0.0814) (0.0872) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.227*** 0.189** 0.197** 0.214*** 0.267*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0915) (0.0812) (0.0803) (0.0858) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00327*** -0.00343*** -0.00285*** -0.00400*** -0.00367*** 
 (0.000966) (0.00117) (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00109) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00305*** -0.00338*** -0.00332*** -0.00347*** -0.00374*** 
 (0.000940) (0.00114) (0.00100) (0.000995) (0.00105) 
Vacate × Before 0.00355*** 0.00298** 0.00328*** 0.00356*** 0.00456*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00135) (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00127) 
Vacate × After 0.00388*** 0.00265** 0.00414*** 0.00412*** 0.00393*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00134) (0.00118) (0.00117) (0.00123) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0149*** -0.0173*** -0.0148*** -0.0179*** -0.0154*** 
 (0.00413) (0.00510) (0.00449) (0.00447) (0.00455) 
Elevation cost × After -0.00187 -0.000221 -0.00351 -0.00262 -0.00714 
 (0.00408) (0.00500) (0.00438) (0.00440) (0.00452) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.0107*** 0.0113*** 0.0120*** 0.0122*** 0.00920*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00220) (0.00196) (0.00194) (0.00199) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00607*** 0.00725*** 0.00690*** 0.00668*** 0.00758*** 
 (0.00178) (0.00223) (0.00195) (0.00192) (0.00198) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00232 -3.03e-05 -0.00270 -0.00129 -0.00131 
 (0.00199) (0.00239) (0.00211) (0.00209) (0.00224) 
Insurance appreciation × After -8.14e-05 0.00143 -0.00143 -0.000483 -0.000193 
 (0.00204) (0.00249) (0.00219) (0.00217) (0.00231) 
Buyout × Before -1.444*** -0.992*** -1.587*** -1.611*** -1.408*** 
 (0.309) (0.375) (0.330) (0.329) (0.347) 
Buyout × After -0.420 -0.150 -0.580* -0.488 -0.290 
 (0.303) (0.375) (0.320) (0.323) (0.340) 
Elevation × Before -0.0286 0.0355 -0.228 -0.0783 0.179 
 (0.180) (0.218) (0.198) (0.195) (0.202) 
Elevation × After 0.0738 -0.0350 -0.0393 -0.0420 0.215 
 (0.179) (0.220) (0.194) (0.191) (0.199) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0850 0.0862 0.0875 0.0879 0.0811 
Log pseudolikelihood -5487.2596 -3726.7046 -4744.9016 -4859.0572 -4337.7053 
Observations (clusters in id) 16,377 (1,366) 11,136 (929) 14,199 
(1,184) 
14,547 (1,213) 12,891 (1,075) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 











Table 3.12A: Conditional logit regression results: interacting sociodemographic with base model  
 
Variables White  Non-White Bachelor/graduate  No bachelor/Graduate 
     
Price × Before 0.0211*** 0.00884** 0.0165*** 0.0191*** 
 (0.00264) (0.00421) (0.00319) (0.00309) 
Price × After 0.0110*** 0.0122*** 0.0120*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00245) (0.00416) (0.00307) (0.00293) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.243*** 0.0206 0.150 0.224** 
 (0.0889) (0.154) (0.108) (0.109) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.256*** 0.150 0.285*** 0.160 
 (0.0862) (0.157) (0.108) (0.108) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00439*** -0.000123 -0.00300** -0.00346** 
 (0.00112) (0.00193) (0.00139) (0.00135) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00336*** -0.00202 -0.00337** -0.00283** 
 (0.00107) (0.00200) (0.00140) (0.00128) 
Vacate × Before 0.00431*** 0.00129 0.00382** 0.00331** 
 (0.00131) (0.00227) (0.00159) (0.00158) 
Vacate × After 0.00302** 0.00631*** 0.00432*** 0.00361** 
 (0.00126) (0.00228) (0.00158) (0.00152) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0144*** -0.0138* -0.0121** -0.0176*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00817) (0.00585) (0.00584) 
Elevation cost × After -0.00600 0.00810 0.00242 -0.00739 
 (0.00486) (0.00790) (0.00579) (0.00577) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.0128*** 0.00555 0.00859*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.00213) (0.00350) (0.00247) (0.00267) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00664*** 0.00507 0.00241 0.0106*** 
 (0.00212) (0.00345) (0.00252) (0.00254) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00159 -0.00332 -0.00540* 0.000420 
 (0.00226) (0.00441) (0.00295) (0.00271) 
Insurance appreciation × After 0.000545 -0.000119 -0.000962 0.000775 
 (0.00229) (0.00462) (0.00294) (0.00286) 
Buyout × Before -1.861*** -0.0598 -1.359*** -1.518*** 
 (0.362) (0.631) (0.448) (0.428) 
Buyout × After -0.375 -0.315 -0.556 -0.309 
 (0.340) (0.668) (0.439) (0.417) 
Elevation × Before -0.366* 0.876** 0.154 -0.241 
 (0.217) (0.340) (0.258) (0.256) 
Elevation × After -0.0239 0.519 0.341 -0.232 
 (0.209) (0.365) (0.247) (0.260) 
     







Observations (Cluster id) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 











Table 3.13A: Conditional logit regression results: interacting sociodemographic with base model  
 
Variables Mortgage No mortgage Insurance No insurance 
Price × Before 0.0190*** 0.0164*** 0.0103*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.00303) (0.00331) (0.00319) (0.00328) 
Price × After 0.0129*** 0.00954*** 0.00771** 0.0148*** 
 (0.00284) (0.00316) (0.00303) (0.00311) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.231** 0.140 0.0842 0.317*** 
 (0.102) (0.117) (0.110) (0.114) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.257** 0.192* 0.201* 0.210* 
 (0.103) (0.112) (0.108) (0.113) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00533*** -0.000683 -0.000991 -0.00490*** 
 (0.00134) (0.00140) (0.00142) (0.00140) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00444*** -0.00145 -0.00215 -0.00294** 
 (0.00127) (0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00134) 
Vacate × Before 0.00443*** 0.00246 0.00303* 0.00388** 
 (0.00153) (0.00168) (0.00164) (0.00164) 
Vacate × After 0.00412*** 0.00364** 0.00291* 0.00329** 
 (0.00144) (0.00170) (0.00161) (0.00160) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0157*** -0.0156** -0.0115** -0.0176** 
 (0.00523) (0.00683) (0.00562) (0.00698) 
Elevation cost × After -0.00727 0.00483 0.00600 -0.0110 
 (0.00532) (0.00644) (0.00559) (0.00686) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.00923*** 0.0149*** 0.00483** 0.0174*** 
 (0.00228) (0.00306) (0.00238) (0.00327) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00731*** 0.00484* 0.00351 0.0120*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00289) (0.00236) (0.00322) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00209 -0.00184 -0.00108 -0.00453 
 (0.00274) (0.00292) (0.00310) (0.00282) 
Insurance appreciation × After -0.000234 0.000330 0.000709 -0.00138 
 (0.00279) (0.00301) (0.00322) (0.00284) 
Buyout × Before -1.244*** -1.585*** -0.175 -2.800*** 
 (0.436) (0.441) (0.465) (0.446) 
Buyout × After -0.385 -0.448 0.406 -1.059** 
 (0.413) (0.446) (0.449) (0.432) 
Elevation × Before 0.503** -0.785*** 1.056*** -1.279*** 
 (0.233) (0.300) (0.248) (0.319) 
Elevation × After 0.489** -0.480* 0.746*** -0.848*** 
 (0.232) (0.285) (0.258) (0.290) 
     







Observations (Cluster id) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 














Table 3.14A: Conditional logit regression results: interacting sociodemographic with base model  
 
Variables Damage No damage 100year floodplain No 100year floodplain 
Price × Before 0.00618 0.0237*** 0.0146** 0.0192*** 
 (0.00399) (0.00271) (0.00608) (0.00248) 
Price × After 0.00441 0.0143*** 0.0177*** 0.0105*** 
 (0.00374) (0.00261) (0.00580) (0.00242) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.234* 0.178* 0.173 0.180** 
 (0.142) (0.0926) (0.209) (0.0870) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.237* 0.225** 0.421* 0.217** 
 (0.143) (0.0896) (0.222) (0.0845) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00251 -0.00358*** -0.00185 -0.00352*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00117) (0.00252) (0.00110) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00126 -0.00395*** -0.00403 -0.00333*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00111) (0.00286) (0.00106) 
Vacate × Before 0.00206 0.00424*** 0.00152 0.00384*** 
 (0.00202) (0.00137) (0.00326) (0.00125) 
Vacate × After 0.00452** 0.00337*** 0.000793 0.00381*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00130) (0.00329) (0.00123) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0132* -0.0130** -0.00844 -0.0167*** 
 (0.00711) (0.00532) (0.0111) (0.00469) 
Elevation cost × After 0.00899 -0.00818 0.00263 -0.00297 
 (0.00692) (0.00536) (0.0118) (0.00463) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.00597** 0.0137*** 0.0111** 0.0111*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00242) (0.00463) (0.00205) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00418 0.00757*** 0.0143*** 0.00526*** 
 (0.00303) (0.00239) (0.00527) (0.00201) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00265 -0.00211 -0.00513 -0.00205 
 (0.00392) (0.00235) (0.00513) (0.00226) 
Insurance appreciation × After -0.00300 0.000845 -0.00246 0.000335 
 (0.00410) (0.00239) (0.00564) (0.00230) 
Buyout × Before 0.185 -2.185*** -1.438* -1.542*** 
 (0.567) (0.374) (0.862) (0.347) 
Buyout × After 0.336 -0.691* -1.122 -0.259 
 (0.577) (0.362) (0.876) (0.343) 
Elevation × Before 1.068*** -0.709*** -0.494 0.0262 
 (0.310) (0.237) (0.473) (0.204) 
Elevation × After 0.709** -0.251 -0.798 0.182 
 (0.325) (0.224) (0.532) (0.201) 
     







Observations (Cluster id) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Table 3.15A: Conditional logit regression results: interacting sociodemographic with base model  
 
Variables Coefficients  
Price × Before 0.0194*** 
 (0.00347) 
× Lower income -0.00318 
 (0.00497) 
 × Higher income -0.00137 
 (0.00603) 
Price × After 0.0106*** 
 (0.00316) 
 × Lower income 0.00258 
 (0.00475) 
 × Higher income -8.46e-05 
 (0.00577) 
Sell both house and lot × Before 0.307** 
 (0.120) 
 × Lower income -0.0847 
 (0.174) 
 × Higher income -0.416** 
 (0.205) 
Sell both house and lot × After 0.244** 
 (0.118) 
 × Lower income -0.123 
 (0.172) 
 × Higher income 0.0706 
 (0.202) 
Acquisition pay period × Before  -0.00319** 
 (0.00150) 
 × lower income -0.000349 
 (0.00215) 
 × higher income -3.63e-05 
 (0.00269) 
Acquisition pay period × After  -0.00431*** 
 (0.00145) 
 × Lower income 0.00210 
 (0.00211) 
 × Higher income 0.00208 
 (0.00258) 
Vacate × Before 0.00310* 
 (0.00172) 
 × Lower income 0.000402 
 (0.00251) 





Table 3.16A Continued  
 
 
Vacate × After 0.00425** 
 (0.00166) 
 × lower income 0.000142 
 (0.00249) 
 × higher income -0.00200 
 (0.00298) 
Elevation cost × Before -0.0130** 
 (0.00636) 
 × lower income -0.00501 
 (0.00951) 
 × higher income -0.000773 
 (0.0108) 
Elevation cost × After -0.00826 
 (0.00598) 
 × lower income 0.00952 
 (0.00945) 
 × higher income 0.0125 
 (0.0106) 
Elevation subsidy × Before 0.00850*** 
 (0.00267) 
 × lower income 0.00692 
 (0.00425) 
 × higher income 0.000527 
 (0.00465) 
Elevation subsidy × After 0.00749*** 
 (0.00269) 
 × lower income 0.00113 
 (0.00416) 
 × higher income -0.00610 
 (0.00454) 
Insurance appreciation × Before -0.00234 
 (0.00300) 
 × lower income -0.000410 
 (0.00440) 
 × higher income 0.00214 
 (0.00567) 
Insurance appreciation × After 0.000372 
 (0.00309) 
 × lower income -0.000923 
 (0.00459) 







Table 3.16A Continued 
 
 
Buyout × Before -1.620*** 
 (0.476) 
 × lower income 0.180 
 (0.690) 
 × higher income 0.714 
 (0.861) 
Buyout × After -0.218 
 (0.443) 
 × lower income -0.537 
 (0.680) 
 × higher income -0.0812 
 (0.829) 
Elevation × Before 0.148 
 (0.270) 
 × lower income -0.811* 
 (0.423) 
 × higher income 0.478 
 (0.469) 
Elevation × After 0.390 
 (0.271) 
 × lower income -1.026** 
 (0.409) 
 × higher income 0.0699 
 (0.472) 
  
Pseudo R2 0.0924 
Log pseudolikelihood -5442.9218 
Observations (Cluster id) 16,377 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 


















Table 3.17A: Results from the estimated compensation variation framework, varying acquisition 
pay period 
 
 Buyout Contract Elevation Contract 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Before 106.602%*** 80.589, 132.614 40.186%*** 23.495, 56.876 
 (13.272)  (8.516)  
After 77.273%*** 31.478, 123.067 -3.206% -104.881, 98.468 
 (23.365)  (51.876)  
Test for difference  29.61% -20.835, 79.493 43.392% -56.964, 143.747 
  (25.594)  (51.203)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01 
Buyout contract (for Before and After timing) comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell 
both house and lot (1); Acquisition pay period (300 days); Vacate (60 days). Home elevation 





Table 3.18 A: Results from the estimated compensation variation framework, varying vacate 
 
 Buyout Contract Elevation Contract 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Before 112.517%*** 80.541, 144.494 40.186%*** 23.495, 56.876 
 (16.315)  (8.516)  
After 84.549%*** 29.961, 139.137 -3.206% -104.881, 98.468 
 (27.852)  (51.876)  
Test for difference  27.968% -32.403, 88.34 43.392% -56.964, 143.747 
  (30.802)  (51.203)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01. 
Buyout contract (for Before and After timing) comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell 
both house and lot (1); Acquisition pay period (365 days); Vacate (90 days). Home elevation 















Table 3.19: Results from the estimated compensation variation framework, varying insurance 
appreciation 
 
 Buyout Contract Elevation Contract 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Before 111.988%*** 79.621, 144.356 40.186%*** 23.495, 56.876 
 (16.514)  (8.516)  
After 94.502%*** 41.220, 147.784 -3.206% -104.881, 98.468 
 (27.185)  (51.876)  
Test for difference  17.486% -40.677, 75.650 43.392% -56.964, 143.747 
  (25.676)  (51.203)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01 
Buyout contract (for Before and After timing) comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell 
both house and lot (1); Acquisition pay period (365 days); Vacate (60 days). Home elevation 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.7A: Results from estimated conditional logit model for risk index obtained using pca 
Variables R = Subjective risk   R= Objective risk 
Price 0.016***  0.017*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Price × R -0.005***  -0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Sell both house and lot  0.185***  0.185 *** 
 (0.065)  (0.064) 
Sell both house and lot × R -0.015  0.053 
 (0.070)  (0.058) 
Acquisition pay period  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Acquisition pay period × R 0.002*  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Vacate  0.002**  0.002** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Vacate × R -0.00003  -0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Elevation cost  -0.007**  -0.008** 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Elevation cost × R 0.008**  0.005 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Elevation subsidy  0.010***  0.009*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Elevation subsidy × R -0.005***  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Insurance appreciation  -0.005**  -0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Insurance appreciation × R -0.002  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Buyout  -1.087***  -1.168*** 
 (0.274)  (0.272) 
Buyout × R 0.779***  0.056 
 (0.290)  (0.263) 
Elevation  -0.282  -0.227 
 (0.176)  (0.168) 
Elevation × R 0.959***  -0.255 
 (0.164)  (0.170)     
Pseudo R-squared 0.135  0.094 
Log pseudolikelihood -3975.329  -4164.537 
AIC / BIC 7986.658 / 8120.535  8365.074 / 8498.952 
Observations 12,552   12,552 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4.8A: Results from the estimated compensating variation framework for risk index 
obtained using pca 
 Subjective risk Objective risk 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
interval 
     
  Buyout   
Mean risk 97.47%*** 69.45, 125.50  107.71%*** 82.34, 133.09  
 (14.3)  (12.95)  
     
 Std dev. for subjective risk index Std dev. for objective risk index 
Induce 10% reduction 0.15** 0.02, 0.28 4.5* 0.69, 8.32  
 (0.07)  (1.95)  
Induce 20% reduction 0.28** 0.04, 0.52 4.5** -0.31, 9.31  
 (0.12)  (2.45)  
     
  Elevation   
Mean risk  47.34%*** 22.07, 72.62 51.69%*** 24.62, 78.49 
 (12.90)  (13.74)  
     
 Std dev. for subjective risk index Std dev. for objective risk index 
Induce 10% reduction 0.05** 0.01, 0.09 -0.87 -5.09, 3.35 
 (0.20)  (2.16)  
Induce 20% reduction 0.09** 0.01, 0.17 -1.55 -7.15, 4.05 
 (0.04)  (2.86)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Buyout contract comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell both house and lot (1); 
Acquisition pay period (300 days); Vacate (60 days). Home elevation contract: Elevation cost 























Figure 4.2A: Scree plot showing eigenvalues for factor analysis (shown in i) and factor analysis 









Figure 4.3A: Scree plot showing eigenvalues for factor analysis (shown in i) and pca analysis 
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Table 4.9A: Results from estimated conditional logit model for risk index obtained using factor 
analysis and considering East and Gulf Coast sample with valid addresses 
Variables R = Subjective risk R = Objective risk 
Price 0.0165*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00186) 
Price × R -0.00545*** -0.000869 
 (0.00197) (0.00167) 
Sell both house and lot  0.205*** 0.207*** 
 (0.0650) (0.0642) 
Sell both house and lot × R -0.0298 0.0509 
 (0.0717) (0.0597) 
Acquisition pay period  -0.00327*** -0.00348*** 
 (0.000823) (0.000801) 
Acquisition pay period × R 0.00165* 0.00100 
 (0.000936) (0.000908) 
Vacate  0.00225** 0.00237** 
 (0.000939) (0.000923) 
Vacate × R -0.000239 -0.00200* 
 (0.00105) (0.00111) 
Elevation cost  -0.00726** -0.00875** 
 (0.00359) (0.00348) 
Elevation cost × R 0.00622* 0.00437 
 (0.00371) (0.00331) 
Elevation subsidy  0.0100*** 0.00941*** 
 (0.00165) (0.00155) 
Elevation subsidy × R -0.00395** 0.000681 
 (0.00165) (0.00152) 
Insurance appreciation  -0.00430** -0.00315 
 (0.00208) (0.00202) 
Insurance appreciation × R -0.00183 0.000337 
 (0.00246) (0.00174) 
Buyout  -1.140*** -1.236*** 
 (0.278) (0.276) 
Buyout × R 0.820*** 0.0872 
 (0.302) (0.289) 
Elevation  -0.294 -0.250 
 (0.179) (0.171) 
Elevation × R 0.902*** -0.142 
 (0.175) (0.157) 
   
Psuedo R2 0.131 0.095 
Log pseudolikelihood -3873.442 -4033.263 
AIC/BIC 7782.883/7916.202 8102.526/8235.844 
Observations (Cluster id) 12,168 (918) 12,168 (918) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 4.10A: Results from the estimated compensating variation framework for risk index 
obtained using factor analysis and considering East and Gulf Coast sample with valid addresses 
 Subjective risk Objective risk 
 Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
interval Min. WTA 
95% Confidence 
interval 
     
  Buyout   
Mean risk 100.50%*** 74.74, 126.26  110.27%*** 85.72, 134.81  
 (13.14)  (12.53)  
     
 Std dev. for subjective risk index Std dev. for objective risk index 
Induce 10% reduction 0.16 -0.06, 0.38 1.26 -2.04, 4.56  
 (0.11)  (1.69)  
Induce 20% reduction 0.3 -0.06, 0.66 2.38 -1.72, 6.48  
 (0.19)  (2.09)  
     
  Elevation   
Mean risk  48.43%*** 23.46, 73.4 53.73%*** 28.03, 79.42 
 (12.74)  (13.11)  
     
 Std dev. for subjective risk index Std dev. for objective risk index 
Induce 10% reduction 0.05** 0.01, 0.09 1.96 -2.60, 6.52 
 (0.02)  (2.33)  
Induce 20% reduction 0.1** 0.02, 0.18 4.68 -1.44, 10.80 
 (0.04)  (3.12)  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Buyout contract comprises the following attributes (levels): Sell both house and lot (1); 
Acquisition pay period (300 days); Vacate (60 days). Home elevation contract: Elevation cost 


























Figure 4.4A: Scree plot showing eigenvalues for factor analysis (shown in i) and factor analysis 














1 2 3 4 5
Number















0 2 4 6 8
Number
Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor
 





I am a faculty member at East Carolina University in Department of Economics, and the director 
of the Center for Natural Hazards Research at East Carolina University. I am asking you to take 
part in my research study entitled, “Government Acquisition of Homes to Reduce Flood Risk; 
Household Willingness to participate and Implications for Acquisition Policy." 
The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that affect your decision to choose flood 
mitigation activities. By conducting this research, I hope to understand what factors motivate 
your decision to participate in flood mitigation programs. Your participation is completely 
voluntary. The survey should take about 20 minutes to complete.  
If you agree to take part in this survey, you will be asked questions that relate to your experience 
in the community, your flood risk perception, flood mitigation choice, and socioeconomic 
background.  
This research is overseen by the University and Medical Center Institutional Review Board 
(UMCIRB) at East Carolina University. It is possible that members of the UMCIRB may need to 
review the research data. We will ask for one piece of personally identifiable information 
(address of your property) from you in the survey. We will use the address to identify 
characteristics of your parcel, such as elevation above sea level, whether the property is in a 
community participating in the Community Rating System (CRS), and Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) flood zone designation. Please keep in mind that personally 
identifiable address information will be kept separately and never combined with other responses 
you give in this survey, thereby maintaining the confidentiality of your responses. Therefore, 
your responses cannot be traced back to you by anyone, including me. 
If you have questions about your rights when taking part in this research, call the Office of 
Research Integrity & Compliance (ORIC) at 252-744-2914 (open weekdays, 8:00 am-5:00 pm). 
If you would like to report a complaint or concern about this research study, call the Director of 
ORIC, at 252-744-1971.  
You do not have to take part in this research, and you can stop at any time. If you decide you are 
willing to take part in this study, continue with the survey by clicking "Yes I Consent" below and 
the research questions will appear.  
Thank you for taking the time to participate in my research. 
Sincerely, Jamie Kruse, Principal Investigator. 
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Yes I Consent 
 





1. Do you have a property in a coastal zone in the United States? (Definition of coastal 













History in Community 
 
3. In which state is your coastal property located? 
 
4. Are you a permanent or a seasonal resident of this community? (Please select only one) 
 
I am a permanent resident 
 
I am a seasonal resident 
 
I own a rental house 
 
5. How long have you owned the house? _______________Years 
 
 
6. Which of the following best describes this house? 
 
Manufactured or Mobile house 
 
Single family house 
 




Apartment or condominium 
 
Some other kind of structure, please describe 
 
I don’t know 
 
 













8. How strong a connection do you and your family feel to this community? (Please drag 
















Questions about experiences on flooding and thoughts on flood risk 
 
 






10. To what extent would you say this property was damaged? If your property has been 
damaged by multiple flood events, please consider the event that caused the most damage. 
 
less than 20% value of the property 
 
20-39% value of the property 
 
40-59% value of the property 
 
60-79% value of the property 
 
80-100% value of the property 
 
 
11. In what year did this damage occur? 
 
 
12. Should a similar flooding event occur today, to what extent do you think your house will 
be damaged? 
 
less than 20% value of property 
 
20 - 39% value of property 
 
40 - 59% value of property 
 
60 - 79% value of property 
 
80 - 100% value of property 
 
 
13. If you tried to sell your property after it was damaged by a flood event, what percentage 






14. When do you think the next flood event will occur in the community where your property 
is located? 
 
Within the next 5 years or less 
 
Within the next 10 years 
 
Within the next 25 years 
 
Within the next 100 years or more 
 
I don't know 
 
 






I don't know 
 
 






I don't know 
 
 







I don't know 
 
 







Introduction to flood mitigation programs 
 
The federal government through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the impacts of flood hazards on residents and their 
property. These efforts include buying or relocating houses found in floodprone 
areas, elevating houses in floodprone areas, and making opportunities available to 
purchase flood insurance 
 
 Programs that involve government purchases of at-risk houses are called Buyout 
Programs. These programs involve the following components: 
What Parts of the Property are Sold: A coastal property includes the house or structure as 
well as the land or lot on which the house is built. Some buyout programs require the owner 
sell both the house and the lot, while others require sale of the house but allow the current 
homeowner to retain ownership of the lot. In this case, the house will be destroyed, but you are 
allowed to rebuild on the lot so long as the new house meets current safety codes. 
Price you will receive if you sell the property: This is the amount of money you will receive, 
as a percentage (%) of the property's value. This value is the pre-damage fair market value of 
what you are selling. If you are selling only the house, this is measured as the value of only the 
house. If you are selling both the house and the lot, this is measured as the value of the house 
and the lot combined. Fair market prices are determined by a licensed appraiser. For example, 
if the value of your property before the flood damage is $100,000, and the government offers 
to pay you 90% of the property value, accepting the offer means you will receive $90,000. 
How long it will take the government to pay you if you sell: This is the number of days it will 
take government officials to pay you for the sale of your house after the buyout contract has 
been agreed-to and signed. 
Time you have to vacate your home: After a buyout agreement has been agreed-to and signed, 
you are given a grace period (number of days) to vacate the house. This is true for all 









Example of a house bought and torn down by the local government (Buyout Program) 
 
 




Programs that involve elevating structures in floodprone areas are called House 
Elevation Programs. These programs involve the following components: 
How much it will cost you to raise your house above ground: this is how much it will cost 
you to raise your house on either piers/ stilts/ pilings, mounds, or raising the foundation. The 
cost is expressed as percent (%) of the fair pre-damage market value of your house. For 
example, if the value of your house is $100,000, and the cost of raising the house is 25%, then 
you will pay $25,000. 
Subsidy you will receive to elevate the house: In these programs, the government may 
subsidize, or pay part of the cost, in order to raise your structure and reduce the risk of flood 
damage. Subsidies are expressed as a percentage of the total cost of raising your house. For 
example, if the total cost of raising your house is $10,000, and you receive a subsidy of 25%, 
that means you will receive a subsidy of $2,500 from the government and will have to 
personally pay the remaining $7,500. 
How much your flood insurance premium will increase (Flood insurance premium 
appreciation): The National Flood Insurance Program has experienced change in recent years. 
Depending on the level of flood risk you and your community face, your flood insurance 
premium may increase. This increase may differ for homes that are elevated, as they are at 
lower risk of flood damage. Flood insurance premium increases are expressed as a percentage 
(%) of your current premium rate. For example, if your current annual flood insurance 


















Choice experiment questions 
 
[Version 1: High Premium Increase] 
 
 
Changes to the National Flood Insurance Program indicate that in the future flood 
insurance premiums in your area may increase by 100%. Suppose your local government 
official has offered contracts to help reduce or eliminate flood risk in your community. In 
the next questions we would like to know whether you would be willing to enter into 
flood risk reduction programs. 
 
We are interested in your true preferences. There are no right or wrong answers 
only what you would actually prefer. The questions are hypothetical 
and research has shown that some people commit to actions in hypothetical situations 
that they would not actually commit to in real life. Please keep this in mind and do your 









[Version 1: House As-is] 
 
Block 1 set 1 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



















Block 1 set 2 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 






























Block 2 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 




market value of 
house 











45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 





























Block 2 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 3 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 3 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 4 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 4 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 5 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 5 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 6 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 6 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Choice Block 7 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Choice Block 7 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 8 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 8 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 













I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 9 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 
receive if you sell 
property 
125% of pre-
damage fair market 
value of property 
Cost to raise 










45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you 
will receive to 
raise house 
above ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 






























Block 9 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 10 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 10 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 11 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 11 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 12 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 













I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 12 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 13 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 13 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 14 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 14 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 15 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 













I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 15 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























[Version 1: House Post-damage] 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 




















Block 1 set 2 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
912 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 2 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 




market value of 
house 











45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 2 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 3 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 3 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 4 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 4 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 5 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 5 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 6 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 6 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 





























Choice Block 7 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 
























Choice Block 7 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 8 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 8 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 9 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 
receive if you sell 
property 
125% of pre-
damage fair market 
value of property 
Cost to raise 










45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you 
will receive to 
raise house 
above ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 


























Block 9 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 10 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 10 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 11 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 























Block 11 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 12 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 12 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 13 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 13 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 14 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 14 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 15 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 15 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 100% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 

























[Version 2: Low Premium Increase] 
 
Changes to the National Flood Insurance Program indicate that in the future flood 
insurance premiums in your area may increase by 50%. Suppose your local government 
official has offered contracts to help reduce or eliminate flood risk in your community. In 
the next questions, we would like to know whether you would be willing to enter into flood 
risk reduction programs.  
We are interested in your true preferences. There are no right or wrong answers, only 
what you would actually prefer. The questions are hypothetical, and research has shown 
that some people commit to actions in hypothetical situations that they would not actually 
commit to in real life. Please keep this in mind and do your best to answer the questions 




[Version 2: House As-is] 
 
 
Block 1 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 












Block 1 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
912 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 2 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 




market value of 
house 











45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 2 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 3 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 3 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 4 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 4 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 5 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 5 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 6 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 




























Block 6 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Choice Block 7 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Choice Block 7 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 8 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 8 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 













I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 9 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 
receive if you sell 
property 
125% of pre-
damage fair market 
value of property 
Cost to raise 










45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you 
will receive to 
raise house 
above ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 





























Block 9 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 10 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 10 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 11 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 11 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 12 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 













I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 12 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 13 set 1 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your property 
as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. You may 














I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 13 set 2 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 14 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 






What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 14 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 15 set 1 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 













I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 15 set 2 
 
 
For the following question, imagine two programs are offered to you regarding your 
property as it currently is. Please consider the options below and select your favorite option. 







What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























[Version 2: House Post-damage] 
 
Block 1 set 1 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 


















Block 1 set 2 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 




market value of 
property 











75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
912 days after 
acceptance 





























Block 2 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 




market value of 
house 











45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 2 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 3 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 3 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 4 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 4 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 



























Block 5 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 























Block 5 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 6 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 6 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 





























Choice Block 7 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 























Choice Block 7 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 8 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 8 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 9 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 
receive if you sell 
property 
125% of pre-
damage fair market 
value of property 
Cost to raise 










45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you 
will receive to 
raise house 
above ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 



























Block 9 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 10 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 10 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 11 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 11 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 
















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 12 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















75 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 12 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 

























Block 13 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 13 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
50% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 14 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















45 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
120 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 14 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 








What will you sell 
to the 
government? 





I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 




You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
60 days after 
acceptance 


























Block 15 set 1 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 















I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















120 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
25% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
90 days after 
acceptance 
























Block 15 set 2 
 
 
For the next question, imagine your house was recently damaged by a flood event. The 
following programs are offered to you regarding your property. Please consider the options 









What will you sell 
to the 
government? 
Both the house 




I would not choose 




This means the 
flood insurance 
premium on this 
property may 
increase by 50% 
Price you will 

















15 days after 
acceptance 
Subsidy you will 
receive to raise 
house above 
ground 
75% of cost of 
raising house 
above ground 
You must vacate 
the house within 
this period 
30 days after 
acceptance 




























19. What is the address of this property? 
 
Please provide the street number and street name here 
 
 
Please provide the 5-digit zip code here 
 
 
20. What is your age? 
 







Attention check question 
 
22. There are a variety of coastal hazards facing homeowners, with some posing a greater 
threat than others. The designers of this survey appreciate the time and effort you devote to 
completing our survey. We feel it is important to reward those who give this commitment by i) 
differentiating them from respondents who speed through surveys without properly reading the 
questions and ii) rewarding thoughtful, engaged respondents accordingly. To demonstrate that 
you have read this question carefully, please select the Mudslides option below. 
 

















23. Which category best describes your race? 
 














24. Which category best describes the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
Did not complete high school 
 
High school diploma 
 
Associate’s/ two year degree 
 
























26. Which category best describes your annual household income? 
 
Less than $10,000 
 
$10,000 - $24,999 
 
$25,000 - $49,999 
 
$50,000 - $74,999 
 
$75,000 - $99,999 
 
$100,000 - $124,999 
 
$100,000 - $124,999 
 
$150,000 - $199,999 
 




Thank you very much for completing the survey. Your contribution to the effort is 
greatly appreciated. 
 
Please direct all other inquiries to: 
 Jamie Kruse, PhD 
East Carolina University 
Department of Economics or Center for Natural Hazards Research 
Greenville, NC 27858-4353 
















APPENDIX E: NOTE ON SURVEY INTRUMENT USED IN CHAPTER 2 
 
Survey instrument used in chapter 2 was designed and administered by, Rachel Davidson, Joseph 
Trainor, Jamie Kruse, and Linda Nozick. Rachel Davidson is a professor at the Department of 
Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Delaware. Joseph Trainor is an associate 
professor at the School of Public and Administration, University of Delaware. Jamie Kruse is a 
distinguished professor at the Department of Economics, East Carolina University, and Linda 








APPENDIX F: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER FOR SURVEY 
USED IN CHAPTERS 3 AND 4  
 
 
